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The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL. cbanue 2. PRCBD 40107D. 28
_LV_C___l_1. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of
the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and
potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report
documents (Appendix C) the independent analysis results
corresponding to the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS)
hardware.
The MAS hardware is required for performing critical functions of
crew ingress/egress, air data parameter data acquisition, thermal
protection of the elevon spar, fittings and External Tank (ET)
umbilica_ cavities, communications support via the Tracking and
Data Relay Satellite, target tracking during rendezvous and
proximity operations, access for cargo to the payload bay,
support for the ATCS and enables pressurized control of
unpressurized compartments during transient pressure periods and
environmental control during static pressure periods.











Air Data Probe (ADP)
Elevon Seal Panel (ESP)
External Tank Umbilical (ETU)
Ku-Band Deploy (KBD)
Payload Bay Doors (PBD)
Payload Bay Radiators (PBR)
Personnel Hatches (PH)
Vent Door Mechanism (VDM)
Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM)
The IOA analysis process utilized avaiiable MAS hardware
drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect
for each failure mode.
Fi_are 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the nine major subdivisions of the MAS. A summary of
the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented
















































































I TOTAL = 158 11O713129O147 1180 1 685 1
imp
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
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The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to re-address
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
Office has undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL re-evaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbi_ersubs_ys--_ems and GFE hardware _
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CILAssessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external in£er_aceS, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis _ _
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime_Contractor FMEA/CIL
re-e:valuation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.Osummarizes the _
asse_ssment of the NASA and Prime contractor FMEAs/CiLS to be
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes



















wStep 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
Z.4 MAS Ground Rulos and Assumptions
The MAS ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined
in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were defined
to limit the analysis to single-failed-parts for each failure
mode. A subset of the "failure mode" and "causes" keywords were






q3 • 0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Funation
The MAS consists of the electrical power, display, control and
mechanism hardware associated with the ADP, ESP, ETU, KBD, PLD,
PBR, PH, VDM and SDM. Figure 2 shows this breakdown. More U
specifically, the MAS consists of the following components:
: : 7_zz Z_ZZ]_ _ _ _ :i = ii
1. The Air Data Probe (ADP) consists of hardware required to U
sense atmospheric conditions and provide digital data
to the GNC subsystem for display and control of the Orbiter
during the Terminal Area Energy Management (below !4K alt-
itude and Mach S) andlanding phase. Pressure data is i
provided below Mach 2.5 to compute angle of attack, accel-
eration, Mach/clean air mass velocity, equivalent and true
airspeed, barometric altitude, and descent rate. Prior to m
this point the flight parameters are computed using inertial
sensed acceleration data and a ground/airborne computed state z
vector. A temperature sensor on the head of the probe was i
designed to provide outside air temperature to be used to
compute the true and equivalent airspeeds. This data is no
longer used by the Orbiter GNC subsystem. =
U
The Mechanical Actuation Assembly consists of a probe
housing mounted to the Orbiter Inner Mold Line and contains
the dual operational redundant three phase AC motors,
reduction gear drive and mechanical linkage required to
rotate the probe mast from its stowed position to its de-
ployed position in the Orbiter air stream. A three position
lever-lock switch for each probe allows the pilot or I
commander to deploy the probe and turn the heaters on if
required. Deployment will occur within 15 seconds with two
motors operating or 30 seconds with only one motor operating, u
The two motors for each probe are powered by seperate Main
AC buses so that any one main AC bus can be used to deploy
at least one ADP. When the probe is fully deployed, a limit
switch is closed which provides feedback to the Motor Control i
Assembly which then removes power from the motors. This same
Motor Control Assembly signal which removes power from the
motors also closes a set of relays that enable the heater
function of the three position switch. All three heaters in
any one probe are powered by the same Forward Power Controller
in the Orbiter. In order to stow either ADP, a separate two
position lever-lock switch must be activated to enable the
stow position of the deploy/heat switch. When fully
stowed, redundant stow limit switches will provide a
signal to the Motor Control Assembly to remove power from
the motors. Reference Figure 3 and Figure 4.
2. Elevons may be deflected from 0 to 40 degrees up
(negative) and 0 to 25 degrees down (positive). As the
elevons traverse the 65 degrees, the Elevon Seal Panels
(ESP) track the elevons and limits heat flow to the










inboard Elevon Seal Panel linkage mechanisms used to
move the 30 Elevon Seal Panels. The linkage mechanism is
attached to the elevon with a clevis and is attached to
the Elevon Seal Panel with another clevis. Thus the
mechanism is driven by elevon displacement and maintains
appropriate clearances between the edge of the elevon and
the Elevon Seal Panel over the 65 degrees of elevon
movement. Reference Figure 5 and Figure 6.
3. The Orbiter External Tank Umbilical (ETU) Doors
protect the aft Orbiter ET Umbilical Cavities from
aerodynamic heating. The ET Umbilical Cavities contain
the aft Orbiter/ET attachment points, the LOX and LH2
feedlines, and electrical connectors. The two ET
Umbilical Doors are held open during ascent by two
centerline latches.
These latches have to be released before the doors can be
closed. Each door is closed by an actuator and
mechanical linkages. On the inside of each cavity are
three uplock latches which engage three uplock rollers on
each door. The latches prevent the door from vibrating
or re-opening. The Umbilical Doors are closed and.
latched by the crew manually except in the event of an
RTLS or contingency abort when the closure sequence is
done by the GNC software. Reference Figure 7 and Figure
8.
4. The Ku-Band Antenna is utilized to support commun-
ications via the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
or to support target tracking during rendezvous and
proximity operations. The Ku-Band Deploy (KBD) Mechanism
facilitates the Ku-Band Antenna as it performs these dual
functions. The Deployment Mechanism consists of the
Deployed Assembly, the Deployment Mechanism Subsystem and
the Electronics Assembly 1. The Electronics Assembly is
located in the Forward Avionics Bay 3A. All other
components are located on the Starboard Payload Bay Sill
Longeron at approximately Z=410, X=589, and Y=I00. The
Deployed Assembly consists of the Antenna Dish, Deployed
Electronics Assembly, Gimbal Mechanism, Gimbal Lock
Mechanism, 2 Lock Pins, 2 Motors and 2 Microswitches.
The Deployment Mechanism Subsystem consists of an
Actuator Assembly with 2 motors, differential and gear
box and a Deployment Mechanism with 2 deploy/stow limit
switches, housing, input/output shaft, balls, Hardstop
and Jettison Assembly with guillotine wire cutter and
Structural Separation Systems, and frangible nut/bolt.
Reference Figure 9 and Figure i0.
5. The Payload Bay Doors (PBD) are comprised of left-hand and
right-hand doors hinged at the Orbiter midfuselage and
latched at the forward and aft fuselage bulkheads. The left
and right doors also are latched along the top centerline.
7
The doors are 60 feet long. They are constructed of graphite/
epoxy composite material. The left door weighs 2,375 pounds
and the right door weighs 2,535 pounds. The right door is
heavier because it carries the active centerline latch
mechanisms. The closed PBD provide the aerodynamic fairing
required for the midfuselage and complete the environmental
envelope for the payload bay. The PBD react fuselage l
torsional loads, support their own flight and purge pressure
loadings, and support the radiators.
mm
There are 16 centerline latches, 8 aft bulkhead latches, and
8 forward bulkhead latches which hold the doors in the closed
position. The latches are grouped in gangs Of four. Each gang
has its own pair of actuating motors, gearbox and drive mechan-
ism.
The PaYload Bay Doors Mechanicai sUbsystem consists of three u
parts. These are the Centerline Latch Mechanism, the Bulkhead
Latch Mechanism, and the Door Drive. Reference Figure ii and =_
Figure 12. _ _ _ ....... =
6. The Payload Bay Radiator (PBR) Deploy Mechanism provides
the capability to release, deploy, stow and latch the two
forward port and starboard radiator panels on the Payload
Bay Doors. The Deploy Mechanism consists of (1) a latch
system and (2) a deployment syst_em. The Latch and
Deployment Mechanisms are located on the Payload Bay
Doors while the Passive Latch Rollers and the Radiator
Hinge Plates are on the radiator panels.
Each deployable radiator is secured to the PBD in the
stowed position by six ganged latches. One latch PDU on
each panel contains two 3-phase motors used to latch or
release the six latches/panel simultaneously. PDU motor
output drives, via torque shafts, three rotary actuators
on each panel. As the torque shaft rotates, the rotary
actuator arm is displaced 53 degrees. This rotational
displacement drives two iatch hookS, connected to the
actuator arm by push rods, bellcranks and links, to the
latch or release state.
Z
The Radiator Deployment System consists of PDUs (one per
side), torque shafts, rotary actuators (two per panel),
deployment cranks and connecting links. Deployment
PDUs, torque shafts and rotary actuators are basically
the same as in the Latch System except for rotational
displacement of the rotary actuator which is 92 degrees
during deployment operations. This rotational
displacement is applied to a deployment crank attached to
the output arm of the Rotary Actuator, which drives the
Radiator Panel to a deployed or stowed state. A
deployment mechanism disconnect feature allows for manual
disconnect of the Deployment Crank by EVA crewman in the













w7. The Personnel Hatches (PH) allow crew and service personnel
ingress and egress capability to the Orbiter. There are
three hatches, the Ingress/Egress Hatch, which allows access
to the Orbiter, and two Airlock H_tches, which allow access
to the airlock and payload bay. All three hatches are on the
middeck and are of a similar design.
Each of the three hatches cqnsist of the following hardware:
Actuator, Hatch Crank, Latches, O-Rings, and Purge Ports. In
addition to the above hardware the Entry Hatch has a 10 inch
viewport. The crank will rotate 450 degrees clockwise and
counterclockwise. When the crank is rotated the actuator
opens and closes the latches. The Entry Hatch has 18 latches
and the Airlock Hatches have 6. These latches pull the hatch
flush with the bulkhead and the O-rings form an airtight seal
(see figure 24). The Purge Ports equalize the pressure be-
tween the two sides of the hatch. This allows the hatch to
be easily opened. Reference Figure 21 through Figure 24.
8. The Vent Door Mechanism (VDM) enables pressure control of
unpressurized compartments during transient pressure
periods and environmental control during static pressure
periods. There are eighteen doors which the Door
Mechanism actuates electromechanically. The doors
provide pressure and environmental control for the
Forward RCS, Forward Fuselage Plenum, Mid Fuselage,
Payload Bay, Aft Fuselage, Vertical Fin, OMS Pods and
Wheel Wells. The Door Mechanism consists of 24 inde-
pendently powered three-phase AC motors, connected via
a differential gearbox and torque shaft/slip clutch
to bellcranks, linkages, rod assembly with bolts, nuts,
washers, cotterpins, microswitch position indicators,
etc. Reference Figure 25 through Figure 27.
9. The Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM) enables an aperature
in the orbiter skin on orbit in the Y & Z axis and
provides protection for the Startracker and compartment
during ascent and entry. The two doors are actuated
electro-mechanically. Each Door Mechanism consists of
two independently powered three-phase AC motors connected
via a differential gearbox/traln, actuator output and
limit switches to either the Y or Z door. Reference
Figure 28 and Figure 29.
--o
1
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The MAS interfaces with many onboard Orbiter systems including
the Active Thermal Control System (ATCS), Air Surface Controls
used for guidance and control, Crew, Guidance and Navigation,
Communication and Tracking, Data Processing System, Electrical
Power Display & Control, Elevons, External Tank Umbilical Door,
Guidance & Navigation, and Purge, Vent & Drain Doors.
9
The MAS hardware is located throughout the Orbiter and interfaces
prinarily with the structure, electrical power, display and
controls. The Air Data Probe and Startracker Door are
located forward of the crew cabin. Personnel Hatches provide
ingress/egress to the crew cabin. Ku-Band Deployment Mechanism,
Payload Bay Doors, and the Payload Bay Radiator Deployment
Mechanism are located in the Payload Bay. Purge, Vent and Drain
Doors are located on each side of the Orbiter. The Elevon Seal
Panels are located on top of each wing. ET Umbilical Doors are
on the bottom side of the Orbiter.
3.3 Hiezszohy
FigAlre 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the MAS hardware and
the corresponding subcomponents. Figures 3 through 23 comprise
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Figure 26 - VENT DOOR MECHANISM LOCATION
-- 35

































































4• 0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the nine major subdivisions
of the MAS. Further discussion of each of these subdivisions






















































































I TOTAL : 158 I lov I 3 I 2901 4v I 18ol 685
4 ..---- .......
Of the 685 failure modes analyzed, 58 failures were determined to
result in loss of crew or vehicle, and ii0 were determined to
result in loss of mission. A summary of the Potential Critical
Items is presented in Table II. Appendix D presents a cross-
reference between each Potential Critical Item (PCI) and a
specific worksheet in Appendix C.







































































I TOTAL : I 58 I 1071 3 I 263 I 45 I 476 I
-t '1-
The scheme for assigning IOA analysis (Appendix C) worksheet
numbers is shown in Table III.
39






























4.1 Analysis Results - Air Data Probe
....The ADP analysisexaminedthe components required £0
deploy the Orbiter Air Data Probes. The analysis
identified Ii failure modes and 212 worksheets were
generated. The analysis results identified 143 PCIs
and these are listed in Appendix D.
4.2 Analysis Results-- E_leyon Seal Panel
4.3
The ESP analysis examined the components of the 34 outboard
and inboard ESP linkage mechanisms. The analysis identified
7 failure modes and 7 worksheets were generated. The
analysis results identified 6 PcIS and these are iisted in
Appendix D.
Analysis Results - External Tank Umbilical
4.4
The ETU analysis examined the components required to
protect the Orbiter ET Umbilical Cavities from entry
heating. The analysis identified 23 failure modes and
73 worksheets were generated. The analysis results
identified 53 PCIs and these are listed in Appendix D.
Analysis Results - Ku Band Deploy
The KBD analysis examined the components required to deploy/
stow the Ku-Band Antenna. The analysis identified potential
failure modes and 200 worksheets were generated. The
analysis results identified 162 PCIs and these are listed in
Appendix D.
4.5 Analysis Results - Payload Bay Doors
The PBD analysis examined the components used to open and
close the Payload Bay Doors. The analysis identified 27
failure modes and 98 worksheets were generated. The analysis



























Analysis Results - Payload Bay Radiators
The PBR analysis examined the components involved in
latching and releasing, and deploying and stowing the
Payload Bay Radiators. The analysis identified 18 failure
modes and 36 worksheets were generated. The analysis
results identified no PCIs.
Analysis Results - Personnel Hatches
The PH analysis examined the possible failures in the
components used to open and close the personnel hatches.
The analysis identified 8 failure modes and 21 work-
sheets were generated. There were 14 PCIs identified
and these are listed in Appendix D.
Analysis Results - Vent Doo{ Mechanism
The VDM analysis examined the components involved in opening
/closing the Active Vent Doors and providing purge control
via these vent ports. The analysis identified 10 potential
failure modes and 27 worksheets were generated. The
analysis results identified 26 PCIs and these are listed in
Appendix D.
Analysis Results - Startracker Door
The SDM analysis examined the components required to open/
close the Startracker Doors. The analysis identified
potential failure modes and 11 worksheets were generated.
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AC - Alternating Current
ADP - Air Data Probe
AOA - Abort Once Around
ATCS - Active Thermal Control System
ATO - Abort To Orbit
BLKHD - Bulkhead
- Critical Item
- Critical Items List
- Center Line
- Criticality
- Data Processing System
- Elevon Seal Panel
- External Tank






























- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Guidance, Navigation and Control
- Hardware
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Ku-Band Deploy
- Line Replaceable Unit
- Mechanical Actuation System
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Motor
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System














- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Potential Critical Item
- Power Drive Unit
- Personnel Hatches
- Payload Bay
- Payload Bay Doors
- Payload Bay Radiator
- Rockwell International
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Power Controller
- Redundant Set













- Startracker Door Mechanism
- Systems Management
- Space Transportation System
- switch
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Touch Down
- Translational Hand Controller
- Torque Limit Clutch
- Volts Direct Current




























Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions








DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions Fo_PreDaration
of FMF___A/CIL, I0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight ........
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE _CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARI,Y M_SSION TERMINATION - termination of on-orbit phase prior
to planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
hig_iest criticality
HIG_[EST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(0pE:)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISS/_0_ - assigned performanceof a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
























MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which performa necessary (critical)
function
OF_-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
pRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
Q_0RBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear




DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, _Dstructions for
Preparation cf FMEA/CIL. 10 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
1 The operational flight software is anaccurate
implementation of the Flight System SoftWare Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this _task.
2. After !iftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
3. Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown. _....._........




All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error





























All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.3 _-Speciflc Ground Rules and AssumptLons
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System. The analysis
considered the worst case effects of the hardware or functional























This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets employed during
the analysis of the Mechanical Actuation System. The information
on these worksheets is intentionally similar to the FMEA's
written by Rockwell and the NASA. Each of these sheets
identifies the item being analyzed, and parent assembly, as well
as the function. For each failure mode, the possible causes are
outlined, and the assessed hardware and functional criticality
for each mission phase is listed, as described in the Rockwell
Desk Instructions 100-2G. Finally, effects are entered at the







LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities :
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission
3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission
Functional Criticalities :
1R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A :
1 I Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
4 - Do Not Know
Redundancy Screens B and C :
P = Passed Screen
F _ Failed Screen








































































AIR DATA PROBE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/1R 3/IR P F P





3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/1R 3/1R P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/1R 3/1R P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3




















































(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-3
AIR DATA PROBE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC- I D H/F H/F A B C
1533; * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1534 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1535 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1536 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1537 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1538 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1539 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1540 3/3 3/3 ........
1541. * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1542, 3/3 3/3
154._; * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1544 313 313
1545 * 311R 311R P F P
1546 3/3 3/3
1547 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1548 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1549 3/3 3/3
1550 * 311R 3/IR P Y P
1551. 3/3 3/3
155;: * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
155_ 3/3 3/3
1554, * 3/IR" 311R P F P
1555 3/3 3/3
1556 * 3/1R 3/IR P F P
1557 3/3 3/3 ...............






156_L * 311R 311R__ :_P:_:FP
1565 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1566 * 3/IR 3/iR P F P
1567 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1568 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1569 3/3 3/3
1570 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1572. 3/3 3/3
1572 * 3/1R 3/IR P F P
1573 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1574 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1575 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1576 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
157_, 3/3 3/3














































































1578 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1579 3/3 3/3
1580 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1581 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1582 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1583 * 3/IR 3/iR P F P
1584 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1585 3/3 3/3
1586 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1587 3/3 3/3
1588 3/3 3/3
1589 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1590 3/3 3/3
1591 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1592 3/3 3/3
1593 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1594 3/3 3/3
1595 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1596 3/3 3/3
1597 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1598 313 313
1599 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1600 3/3 3/3
1601 * 3/IR 3/iR P F P
1602 3/3 3/3
1603 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1604 3/3 3/3
1605 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1606 3/3 3/3
1607 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1608 3/3 3/3
1609 * 3/IR 3/1R P F P
1610 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1611 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1612 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1613 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1614 3/3 3/3
1615 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1616 3/3 3/3
1617 * 3/IR 3/1R P F P
1618 3/3 3/3
1619 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1620 3/3 3/3






















































AIR DATA PROBE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
1623 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1624 3/3 3/3
1625 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1626 3/3 3/3
1627 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1628 3/3 3/3








1637 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1638 3/3 = 3/3 I i _ i
1639 * 3/IR 3/!R P F P
1640 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1641 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1642 ..... 3/3 .... 3/3
1643 3/3 3/3
1644 3/3 3/3
1645 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1646 3/3 3/3
1647 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1648 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1649 * 3/IR 3/1R P F P
1650 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1651 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1652 * 3/IR 3/IR_ P F P
1653 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1654 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1655 * 3/IR 3/1 _ P F P
1656 * 3/iR 3/IR PF P
1657 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1658 * 3/!R 3/1R P F P
1659 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1660 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1661 * 3/1R 3/IR P F P
1662 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1663 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1664 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1665 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1666 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1667 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P







PO_R SUPPLY TEST AMP





























































AIR DATA PROBE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
1668 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1669 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1670 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1671 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1672 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1673 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1674 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1675 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1676 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1677 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1678 * 3/IR 3/1R P F P
1679 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1680 * 3/IR 3/1R P F P
1681 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1682 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1683 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1684 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1685 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1686 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1687 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1688 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1689 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1690 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1691 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1692 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1693 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1694 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1695 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1696 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1697 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1698 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P




OS C I LLATOR






























(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM


























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBE WILL NOT DEPLOY.
REFERENCES".
n
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/!R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 .....





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRU_L FAILURE ..........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF THE PRESSURE LINE WILL RESULT IN INCORRECT PRESSURES




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-II
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





































-REDi_DANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MA. ADS. PRB
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRU_L_ILURE .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







BLOCKAGE OF THE PROBE PRESSURE PORTS WILL RESULT IN INCORRECT





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
i
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MA. ADS. SHF
CAU$:ES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
c[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM



























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAI_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL CAUSE PROBE TO DEPLOY AT AN INCORRECT ATTITUDE. THIS WILL
IN TURN CAUSE INCORRECT PRESSURES TO BE SENT TO THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
w













































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ADS .MCH.MS. DEP
] c [ ]
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRU_LFAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISPLAYS WILL NEVER SHOW THAT AIR DATA PROBE IS DEPLOYED.
REFERENCES:



































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDWI FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT : / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
RED[_DANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO_%TION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PAR[_ NUMBER: ADS.MCH.MS.STW
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ADS. MCH. MS. STW
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:























LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BRE_DOWNHIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
RED[mDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PAR_ NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRU_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ]'MMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE _COMMANDED











































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CNI




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-21
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN2
CAU_ES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED

































































RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN2


























LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BRE_/q)OWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES




SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND_ONTROL P_L C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN3
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAI_S COULD CAUSE UNCO_DED






















REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-24
mm
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ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN






































LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN3










REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT

































RIG_ AIR DATA PROBE
DEP_Y POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT










REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
_CATION: DISP_Y _D CONTROL P_EL C3
P_T _BER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN4
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T S_U_L FAIL_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





































ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5 ) SWITCHES

















C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN4






























LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BRE;_d<DOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELE_ICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CNI
c C ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFeCTS/RATIONALE:






































ITEM: +28V CONTACT #i
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES

















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER










ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN2






























































RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAYING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
_: =
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN3













































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
























LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES

















REDTmDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND cONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN4
c [ ]












































ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
















RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN4
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOC_TION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS. DC. SW. RP. STW. CNI

































































RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.STW.CNI




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS. DC. SW.RP. STW. CN2
C [ P ]





















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.STW.CN2










REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




















































RED[_DANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.STW.CN3






















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.STW.CN3




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS .DC .SW. RP .STW .CN4




















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:

















REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-43 < " _-_
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C







ITEM: +28V CONTACT #i
FAII_RE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEA[) ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) DIsP_Y AND CONTROLS
5 ) SWITCHES




SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PAR_ NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RPS.EN.CNI














































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
ENABLE POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RPS.EN.CNI








REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREakDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM











RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
ENABLE POSITION
CRITICALITIES











RED[_DANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCI_ION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RPS.EN.CN2




















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
ENABLE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RPS.EN.CN2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE FAILURE TO
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RE_JNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO_%TION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RPS.IN.CNI




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RPS.IN.CNI




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
INHIBIT POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOC_ TION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RPS.IN.CN2




REPORT DATE 11/-25/87 C-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES

















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RPS.IN.CN2




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR DATA PROBE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CNI




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
















LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RE_rNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCI_ION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO J[MMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR DATA PROBE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-54
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITI_ALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PA_T NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR DATA PROBE.
REFERENCES:
REI<)RT DATE 11/25/87 C-56
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES















DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN3




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PAR? NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ZMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR DATA PROBE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-58
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






















































C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN4




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-59
=mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER : ADS. DC •SW. LP •DH. CNI




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: +28V CONTACT #I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

























































DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CN2







































LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:





















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c C ]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW. LP.DH.CN3




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-65
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
















LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RED[_DANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CN4




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-66
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES".
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

































LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS. DC. SW. LP. STW. CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STO_rAGE OF THE PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-68
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

































LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.STW.CNI




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2
FAII_JRE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
















LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES















DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.STW.CN2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
REFERENCES :









































LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.STW.CN2








REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-71
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
Z
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES

















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.STW.CN3
C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF THE PROBE.






























































LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]












SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-73
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW. LP.STW.CN4












































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.STW.CN4










REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-75
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
























I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.EN.CNI



















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES




















DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.EN.CNI










REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-77
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
ENABLE POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.EN.CN2














































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
ENABLE POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.EN.CN2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE FAILURE TO
w REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-79
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
INHIBIT POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.IN.CNI











































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.IN.CNI







REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

































LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
INHIBIT POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.IN.CN2





















REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-82
wn
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
INHIBIT POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.IN.CN2





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-83
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.DEI.IAG
c[P]
































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.DEI.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE PROBE.
REFERENCES:
W
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-85
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]




































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.DE2.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/iR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.STI.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-89
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/!R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _-_ _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.ST2.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURKL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

















































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE OF
PROBE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-91
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


















































ADS. MCA. DE 1. RD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-93
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS :









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.DE2.RD
c[P]


















































































SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREENT DEPLOYMENT
REFERENCES:




















































































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B E ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.STI.RD








REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-97
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FoRW_D AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.ST2.RD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE



























































































REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-99
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED


















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3











































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.DE2.RLY


































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE PROBE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I03
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.STI.RLY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF P-ROBE. T_






















REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I04 _-
B
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.STI.RLY




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I05
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED

































































































































REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I07
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.AG
c [ ]












































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I09
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















































































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER









iTEM: SOLID STATE DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.SSD
] c C ]






































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER






REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORTED : :





























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.RPC












































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER






REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-115
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA_CH: / .... RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.270.RPC
] c [ ] ......
















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.270.RPC
c[p]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










































REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] cc ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA. 330.RPC

















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER







REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.SRL
c [ ]











































































A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.SRL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER



















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.LRL
c [ ]




















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECTS. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER





































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT. PS. FIL

























































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






REPORT DATE 11/25/87 c-125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL






SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:











AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.OA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
c[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-127
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:








LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
r














AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES












REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. PS. REG








































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















































A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.GEN
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES












REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION : FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. PS. CLK
C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



























































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.CLK
C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-133
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL






SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I RTLS : 3131
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
























































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :











AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.-QT


























































i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.-QT
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




















FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED














AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.TMR
c [ ]









































FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED






































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. PS. +AM
] c [ ]















































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
w REFERENCES:
w



















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:











AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.-AM

















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:











AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-143
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]

















































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN














AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
REFERENCES:
=
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
































































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-147
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TA














































POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP
FAILS OPEN














AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1630 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD A_/IONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TB.HA














































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TB.HA




































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TB.LA











































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN


































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-153
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.TT




































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER TEMPERATURE DATA.
w
REFERENCES:




















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.FET














































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.FET
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
w

































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.CC
c [ ]

















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.CC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-159
,,.,.
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













































I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










































REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
_CATION: FORW_D AVIONICS BAYS
P_T _BER: ADS.ADT.TC.TTA
] c C ]
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONAL_.:



































ITEM: TRANSDUCER TEMP AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:











AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-163
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1644 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM









AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES





















































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-165
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 .........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. TC.












































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






















I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL















3/3 -; ..... :i_ :



















































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM


































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:










ITEM: SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED


















AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.SSR
B [ F ] c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.SSR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-171
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
























































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-173
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. AD. AS
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-175
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:








LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:











AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES















ADS. ADT. AD. AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.AD.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
n
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-177
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES















A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.AD.SL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






















































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



























































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-181
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-183
J
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
• q F _ =
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.AD.REG
C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN














AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-185
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: DISCREET INPUT BUFFER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED














AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL




























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:


















FAILS SHORTED _ ..........














AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. SPC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".


































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
























C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.CG.OSC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
L REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-191
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: 2 MH2 CLOCK
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED















































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:










































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
u REFERENCES:






























AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR -_
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS




CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:










































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.CG.ICL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-195
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL






























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:























































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-197
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



























































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL






SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LI FT0_FF / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


































































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





















FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
















AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
























































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL




















A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.DO.BUF
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
























































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.DO.OC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

























































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
















ADS .ADT. DO .OC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
m REFERENCES"
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:











AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE'PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-209
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL






SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN














AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES












A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.DO.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:























LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:











AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAU_CH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
























C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.DO.CPU
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-213
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL PROCESSOR
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


















































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES".
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-215
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL PROCESSOR
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN














AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL PROCESSOR
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-217
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




























AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL PROCESSOR
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN








































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





































21oo * 1/1 i/1
2101 * I/I i/I
2102 * i/I I/i
2103 * i/I I/I
2104 * I/I i/i
































FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BiNDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR-FROZEN BEARING SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RT_: I/i
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




OUTBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
V070-596009-007/008, 10-001/013, 70-001/005, 77-001
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELEVON SPAR AND FITTINGS LOOSE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS











































FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE












ELEVON SEAL PANEL LINKAGE
ROD ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 1/l
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: INBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
PART NUMBER: V070-596003-001/016, 80-001/007, 82-001/004, 87-
001/007 (50 TOTAL)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELEVON SPAR AND FITTINGS LOOSE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-223
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, _ BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
ELEVON SEAL PANEL LINKAGE
BELLCRANKS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OUTBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
PART NUMBER: V070-596011-001/4, 12-005/006, 14-001/002, 22-
001/002, 23-001/006 (16 TOTAL)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS






























FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 2/2 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : 2/2 AOA : i/1
DEORBIT : I/i ATO : i/1
I2%NDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: INBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
PART NUMBER: V070-596004-001/002, 005-001/006, 006-001/002, 007-
001/002, 024-001/002, 025-001/002, 026-001/002, 027-001/002, 028-
001/002 (18 TOTAL)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELEVON SPAR AND FITTINGS LOOSE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, BROWN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN: BEARING SURFACE _
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM








SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OUTBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
PART NUMBER: V070-596083-001-4; MDIII-1001-0416, 18, 19; 0515-
19, 0616-18, 22; MDIII-I002-0413 (i00 TOTAL)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
E_VON SPAR AND FITTINGS LOOSE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS










































FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: INBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
PART NUMBER: V070-596083-001-4; MDIII-1001-0418, 19, -0516-18,
23, 27, -0616, 18, 22, 27; MDIII-I002-0517 (118 TOTAL)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELEVON SPAR AND FITTINGS LOOSE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS
ORBITER EXPERIENCES LOSS OF: ELEVONS, HYDRAULIC FLUID, CONTROL,
VEHICLES/CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-596001
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ESP FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2106 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 100-105 (WASHER,
BUSHING, NUT, COTTER PIN, SAFETY WIRE, ETC)
FAILURE MODE: ALL FAILURE MODES












ELEVON SEAL PANEL LINKAGE
ALL REMAINING PARTS
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
INBOARD/OUTBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 100-105
CAUSES: ALL CAUSES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 100-105 WILL HAVE NO


























ET UMBILICAL ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
m_m_m
3101 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3102 * 2/IR 2/1R P F P
3103 3/3 3/3
3104 3/3 3/3
3105 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3106 * 1/1 1/1
3107 * 1/1 1/1
3108 * 1/1 1/1
3109 * 2/1R 2/1R P P P
3110 3/3 3/3
3111 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3112 * 2/1R 2/1R P P P
3113 3/3 3/3
3114 3/3 3/3
3115 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3116 * i/i i/i
3117 * i/i i/I
3118 * i/I i/1
3119 * i/I i/I
312o , 1/1 1/1
3121 * i/I i/I
3122 * i/i I/I
3123 * 1/1 1/1
3124 * 2/!R 2/IR P P P
3125 3/3 3/3
3126 * I/! i/i
3127 * 1/1 1/1
3128 * 1/1 1/1
3129 * 1/1 1/1
3130 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3131 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3132 3/3 3/3
3133 3/3 3/3
3134 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3135 * 1/1 1/1
3136 * 1/1 1/1
3137 * 1/1 1/1
3138 * 1/1 1/1
3139 * 1/1 1/1
3140 * 1/1 1/1
3141 * i/I i/i
3142 * I/I 1/l
3143 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
3144 3/3 3/3










CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BRAKE







CLOSURE TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
CLOSURE TORQUE _BE ASSEMBLY
DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH












UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH LINKAGE
INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH LINKAGE
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MEC_ISM
READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH



























ET UMBILICAL ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
_w_wm
3502 3/3 3/3




3507 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3508 3/3 3/3
3509 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3510 3/3 3/3
3511 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3512 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3513 3/3 3/3
3514 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3515 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
3516 * 2/1R 2/1R P P P
3517 * 2/1R 2/IR P P P
3518 3/3 3/3
3519 * 2/1R 2/1R P F P
3520 3/3 3/3
3521 3/3 3/3
3522 * 2/IR 2/IR F F P
3523 3/3 3/3
3524 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
3525 * 2/IR 2/IR F F P
3526 * 2/IR 2/IR F F P
3527 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
3528 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P





ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH










MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH









FUSE, IA, ACTUATOR STATUS
RESISTOR, 1.2K, MCA LOGIC SW
RESISTOR, 1.2K, MCA LOGIC SW
u















ITEM: CENTERLINE LATCH MOTOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO START




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCA_0N: A_ FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF OUTPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A CENTERLINE LATCH MOTOR WOULD RESULT IN SECOND MOTOR
STOWING THE LATCH AT A REDUCED RATE. LOSS OF SECOND MOTOR WOULD































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CLUTCH TO ENGAGE WOULD REDUCE POWER TRANSFER FOR LATCH




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-233
U
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: CENTERLINE MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO DISENGAGE
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: ..... 5/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, __CAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLUTCH FAILING TO DISENGAGE WOULD REDUCE REDUNDANCY.































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO ENGAGE AND HOLD CENTERLINE LATCH IN STOWED







REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-235
z
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























ET _BILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM _: '
CENTERLINE MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: _/IR
LIFTOFF : / TAL: 2/--1R=
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO DISENGAGE WOULD REDUCE POWER TRANSFER FOR






































CENTERLINE LATCH DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : / AOA: i/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT CENTERLINE LATCH FROM STOWING AND
UMBILICAL DOOR FROM CLOSING. HEAT COULD ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY





















CENTERLINE LATCH DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
PARTIAL OUTPUT _ _ _ _











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENT_RLINE LATCH _CH_SM _'_
CENTERLINE LATCH DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: / TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT : 1/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PARTIAL TRANSMISSION OF MOTOR POWER WOULD SLOW LATCH OPERATION.
MOTOR_ REACHSTALLTI_ BEFORE L_TC_RE_HES STO_POSiTTO_ _












































































B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565062-001/V070-565062-002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF LATCH ON ASCENT OR BEFORE LATCH CLEARS UMBILICAL DOOR
PREVENTS CLOSURE WHICH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ORBITER/CREW. FAILURE
AFTER LATCH CLEARS DOOR AT WORST WOULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO LATCH DUE
TO AERODYNAMIC HEATING ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-565000















CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICALDOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM ......
CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/I R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: _ /
LANDING/SAFING: / _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-
PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT OPERATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE CLOSING OF CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH WOULD CAUSE











































CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNTIL LATCH REACHES LIMIT, MOTOR





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-241
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 3111 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: _ _ _ I
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR
FAi_ TO START



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF UMBILICAL DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR WOULD RESULT IN SECOND MOTOR
CLOSING THE UMBILICAL DOOR AT A REDUCED RATE. LOSS OF SECOND











































DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILS TO ENGAGE












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MACHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: y AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CLUTCH TO ENGAGE WOULD REDUCE POWER TRANSFER FOR DOOR





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-243
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DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILS TO DISENGAGE ........
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
3) CENTERLINE LATCH MACHANISM






SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLUTCH FAILING TO DISENGAGE WOULD REDUCE REDUNDANCY. UMBILICAL











































DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BRAKE
FAILS TO ENGAGE












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MACHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






















DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BRAKE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE ........ _ i












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MACHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,_C_ICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO DISENGAGE WOULD REDUCE POWER TRANSFER FOR






































TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/I
LI FTOFF: / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : / AOA: i/1
DEORBIT : I/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT DOOR CLOSURE. ALLOWS HEAT TO ENTER
UMBILICAL CAVITY ON ENTRY. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-247
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY
PARTIAL OUTPUT












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF : / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
PARTIAL INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PARTIAL TRANSMISSION OF MOTOR POWER WOULD SLOW UMBILICAL DOOR
CLOSURE. DOOR CLOSURE MOTORS REACH STALL TIME BEFORE DOOR














































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT DOOT FROM BEING CLOSED. HEAT
ENTERS UMBILICAL CAVITY DURING ENTRY. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES" V070-56500

















DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY ........... '
LINKAGE BROKEN/UNATTACHED _ _.....
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN/UNATTACHED DOOR LINKAGE PREVENTS DOOR CLOSURE OR ALLOWS
CLOSURE BUT DOOR CANNOT SEAL OPENING ALLOWING HEAT TO ENTER














REFERENCES: vo o-565oo B
















ITEM: HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565017-00I/V070-565017-004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT DOOR FROM BEING CLOSED. OPEN
UMBILICAL DOOR ALLOWS HEAT TO ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY ON ENTRY.





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-251
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY .......
LINKAGE BROKEN/UNATTACHED











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM _
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM ..... _ ........
HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/l
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
BROKEN/UNATTACHED HINGE LINKAGE PREVENTS DOOR CLOSURE OR ALLOWS
CLOSURE BUT DOOR CANNOT SEAL OPENING ALLOWING HEAT TO ENTER










































DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565010
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY PREVENTS DOOR CLOSURE
BECAUSE ALL DOOR CLOSURE LINKAGES ARE DRIVEN BY TORQUE TUBE.



















DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
TORQUE TUBE BROKEN .....












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURETORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BRg_N TORQUE TUBEP_REVENT S DO0 R C I_SURE_BECAUSE ................ALL LINKAGES ARE










































DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: • / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-
PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT OPERATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE CLOSING OF DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH WOULD CAUSE MOTOR




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-255
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









DOOR CLOSURE _LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
=















DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3









CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR WOULD NOT RECEIVE CUTOFF COMMAND WHEN
UMBILICAL DOOR CLOSES. ALSO LOSE SIGNAL OF DOOR CLOSURE WITH
APPLICABLE MISD SHOWING DOOR OPEN. PROCEDURE IS MANUAL ON





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING DOOR HINGE PREVENTS DOOR CLOSURE. DOOR ALLOWS




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-257
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565030-003
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A HINGE WOULD PREVENT DOOR CLOSURE OR NOT SEAL THE
DOOR IN THE OPENING. HEAT COULD ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY DURING













































BROKEN OFF DOOR COMPLETELY/PARTIALLY
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565160-001 & 002/V070-565166-001 & 002/1070-
565167-001 & 002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMPLETE OR PARTIAL LOSS OF AN UPLATCH ON ASCENT PREVENT LATCHING






























ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM _ _!
UMBILICAL DOOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: /
LANDING/SAFI_: / _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DAMAGE TO UMBILICAL DOOR CAUSES LOSS OF TILES OR WARPS DOOR.
ALLOWS HEAT TO ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY DUE TO MISSING TILES OR



































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF UPLATCH MOTOR WOULD MEAN SECOND MOTOR WOULD LATCH







REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-261
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
3) UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM






SUBSYS LEAD: H.Jo LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CLUTCH TO ENGAGE WOULD REDUCE POWER TRANSFER FOR
DRIVING UPLATCH MECHANISM. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD LATCH DOORS BUT


























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLUTCH FAILING TO DISENGAGE WOULD REDUCE REUNDANCY. UPLOCK



















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, _CHANi_AL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE TO ENGAGE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT.








































ITEM: UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO DISENGAGE

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BRAKE FAILING TO DISENGAGE AT START OF UPLATCH MOTOR OPERATION




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-265
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 3135 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING











TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/_
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT DOOR LATCHING. DOOR WOULD NOT BE
SECURELY CLOSED ALLOWING IT TO OPEN OR NOT SEAL PROPERLY. ALLOWS




























6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/ETUD FLIGHT: i/1
3136 ABORT : I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY
PARTIAL OUTPUT












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
PARTIAL INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PARTIAL TRANSMISSION OF MOTOR POWER WOULD SLOWDOOR LATCHING.
MOTORS REACH STALL TIMELIMIT BEFORE DOOR LATCHED. IF UMBILICAL
DOORS NOT CLOSED HEAT COULD ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY ON ENTRY.
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ITEM: UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING















ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF: / TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565130-001/V070-565130-O02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY PREVENTS DOOR BEING
LATCHED DUE TO OUTBOARD UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISMS BEING DRIVEN BY
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY. UMBILICAL DOOR NOT SECURELY LATCHED COULD




































ITEM: UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: TORQUE TUBE BROKEN
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN TORQUE TUBE PREVENTS DOOR LATCHING BECAUSE INBOARD UPLATCH
LOCK MECHANISM IS DRIVEN BY TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY. ON ENTRY HEAT
COULD ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-565000
w

















INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH LINKAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING /_ .....
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
3) UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565144-001/V070-565144-002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_IONA_:
BINDING/JAMMING OF LINKAGE PREVENTS OPERATION OF INBOARD LATCH
CAPTURE AND SECURING UMBILICAL DOORS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
UMBILICAL DOOR COULD OPEN ALLOWING HEAT TO ENTER DURING ENTRY.










































INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH LINKAGE
BROKEN/UNATTACHED












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565144-001/V070-565144-002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN/UNATTACHED LINKAGE PREVENTS CAPTURE OF INBOARD ROLLER AND
SECURE DOOR LATCH. UMBILICAL DOOR COULD OPEN AND ALLOW HEAT TO
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ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : / AOA: I/1
DEORBIT : I/1 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565102-001 & 002/V070-565103-001 & 002/V070-
565104-001 & 002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING PREVENTS CAPTURE OF ROLLER ON DOOR. WITHOUT
SECURE LATCH DOOR MAY OPEN ON ENTRY ALLOWING HEAT TO ENTER

































ITEM: UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
FAILURE MODE: BROKEN/UNATTACHED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF : / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : / AOA : i/1
DEORBIT : I/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565102-001 & 002/V070-565103-001 & 002/V070-
565104-001 & 002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN/UNATTACHED LATCH MECHANISM PREVENTS DOOR BEING LATCHED.
DOOR MAY OPEN ON ENTRY ALLOWING HEAT TO ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-56500









ITEM: READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OPERATION














ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-
PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT OPERATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE INDICATION OF READY TO LATCH WOULD CAUSE MOTOR TO STOP.
REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO CAPTURE ROLLER BUT AT A REDUCED




















































READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH












ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO INDICATE READY TO LATCH CAUSES CONTINUED MOTOR
OPERATION. LATCH MECHANISM WILL CONTACT A STOP AND STALL MOTOR.
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FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE, AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
K7-KI0, KI2-KI8, K57, K59
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELAY IS USED TO STOW THE CENTERLINE LATCHES, CLOSING THE
UMBILICAL DOORS, OR ENGAGING THE UPLOCK LATCHES. FAILURE OF
RELAY CAUSES AN OPEN CIRCUIT AND THE LOSS OF AC POWER TO A MOTOR.
THE REDUNDANT MOTOR CONTINUES THE PARTICUALR FUNCTION BUT AT A
















REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099 u
I





















FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE, AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
K7-K10, KI2-KIS, K57, K59
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF RELAY TO OPEN HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM A MOTOR WHEN SECOND RELAY
OPENS FOR CENTERLINE LATCH STOWING AND UPLOCK LATCH ENGAGEMENT.
DOOR CLOSURE RELAY DOES NOT HAVE REDUNDANCY BUT POWER CAN BE
REMOVED BY FLIGHT DECK SWITCHES.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
= :






























SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE, AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
K5, K6, KI0-KI2, KI4, K15, KI7-K20, K56, K58
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELAY IS USED TO LOCK THE CENTERLINE LATCHES, OPENING THE
UMBILICAL DOORS, OR RELEASE THE UPLOCK LATCHES. THE ET UMBILICAL
DOORS MUST BE OPENED ASAP POSTLANDING WHEN A TAL OR RTLS OCCURS
AND FOR ALL OTHER CASES IF THERE IS AN INDICATION OF H2
BUILDUP. RELAY FAILURE REDUCES REDUNDANCY. SECOND MOTOR WOULD









































LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE, AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
PART NUMBER: K5, K6, KI0-KI2, KI4, KI5, KI7-K20, K56, K58
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELAY IS USED TO LOCK THE CENTERLINE LATCHES, OPENING THE ET
UMBILICAL DOORS, OR RELEASE THE UPLOCK LATCHES. FAILURE OF RELAY
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ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH FROM GPC TO MANUAL MODE












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH TO MOVE FROM GPC TO
MANUAL MODE HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. SWITCH
FAILING IN THE GPC MODE WILL NOT PREVENT ET UMBILICAL DOOR
CLOSURE. THE NECESSARY COMMANDS CAN BE SENT TO THE ORBITER FROM
MCC. SWITCH IS IN GPC MODE ON ASCENT TO ALLOW GNC SOFTWARE TO
CLOSE THE DOORS DURING AN RTLS. THIS MODE IS ALSO USED FOR REAL-









































ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM MANUAL TO GPC MODE












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH TO MOVE FROM MANUAL TO
GPC MODE HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. SWITCH
FAILING IN THE _AL MODE KEEPS SUPPLYING RELAY LOGIC POWER FROM
THE FOUR CONTROL BUSES. THIS POWER CAN BE TAKEN OFF LINE BY
SWITCHING OFF THREE MCA LOGIC SWITCHES (SWITCHES $4, SI0, SI4 ON
PANEL MA73CB). IF POWER IS LEFT ON-LINE, MANUAL OPERATION OF





















FAILS TO SWITCH FROM GND TO STOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM GND TO STOW PREVENTS THE FOUR
CONTROL BUSES FROM SUPPLYING RELAY LOGIC POWER TO THE AFT MOTOR
CONTROLLERS. THIS PREVENTS MANUAL CENTELRINE LATCH STOWING. NO











































FAILS TO SWITCH FROM STOW TO GND
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM STOW TO GND HAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. SWITCH ENABLES OPERATION OF THE TWO
CENTERLINE LATCHES ACTUATORS. WHEN ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
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ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
3) DISPLAY AND CONTROL









PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$49 (LEFT), $51 (RIGHT)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM OFF TO CLOSE PREVENTS THE FOUR
CONTROL BUSES FROM SUPPLYING RELAY LOGIC POWER. THIS PREVENTS
MANUAL CLOSING OF THE LEFT AND RIGHT ET UMBILICAL DOORS. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION BECAUSE OF ALTERNATIVE GPC








































ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM CLOSE TO OFF












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$49 (LEFT), $51 (RIGHT)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM CLOSE TO OFF HAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. OFF SWITCH POSITION REMOVES RELAY LOGIC
POWER FOR MANUAL DOOR OPERATION. WHEN ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE
SWITCH ($47) IS IN GPC MODE THIS WILL DISABLE LEFT/RIGHT ET










ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C FLIGHT :






ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO OPEN












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$49 (LEFT), $51 (RIGHT)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ET UMBILICAL DOORS MUST BE OPENED ASAP POSTLANDING WHEN A TAL
OR RTLS OCCURS AND FOR ANY OTHER CASE IF THER IS AN INDICATION OF
H2 BUILDUP. POSSIBLE LOSS OR DAMAGE TO ORBITER MAY OCCUR IF



















REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099 mg
HI



























ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO LATCH












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$50 (LEFT), $52 (RIGHT)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM OFF TO LATCH PREVENTS THE FOUR
CONTROL BUSES FROM SUPPLYING RELAY LOGIC POWER. THIS PREVENTS
MANUAL LATCHING OF THE LEFT AND RIGHT ET UMBILICAL DOORS. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION BECAUSE OF ALTERNATIVE GPC


















ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH_RELEASE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM LATCH TO OFF












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$50 (LEFT), $52 (RIGHT)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM LATCH TO OFF HAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. OFF SWITCH POSITION REMOVES RELAY LOGIC
POWER FOR MANUAL DOOR OPERATION. WHEN ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE






































ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO RELEASE












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
PART NUMBER: $50 (LEFT), $52 (RIGHT)
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ET UMBILICAL DOORS MUST BE OPENED ASAP POSTLANDING WHEN A TAL
OR RTLS OCCURS AND FOR ANY OTHER CASE IF THERE IS AN INDICATION
OF H2 BUILDUP. POSSIBLE LOSS OR DAMAGE TO ORBITER MAY OCCUR IF
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FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF : / o TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: oRBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
P_T _BER: F36, F37, F38, F39
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, O_RLOAD, PIECE-P_T FA7LURE, VIBRATION,
MEC_ICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: '_
BLOWN FUSE REDUCES REDUNDANCY. REDUNDANT CONTROL BUSES WOULD
STILL BE ABLE TO SUPPLY NEEDED POWER FOR CENTERLINE LATCH, DOOR








































MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
AC BUS
MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR





CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, INADVERTENT OPERATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CIRCUIT BREAKER CAUSES LOSS OF THE THREE PHASE AC
POWER FROM THE MAIN AC BUS. THIS CAUSES THE LOSS OF 4 MOTORS.
REDUNDANT MOTORS WILL COMPLETE FUNCTION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE.
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MCA _Y _GIC POWER SWITCH
FAI_ OFF












ET _BILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISP_Y _D CONTROL
CONTROL BUS













REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_CATION: P_EL _73CB
P_T _BER: $4, SI0, S14
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, PIECE-P_T FAILURE,
VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
SWITCH FAILING IN THE OFF POSITION CAUSES THE _SS OF CONTROL
SIGNAL TO THE ASSOCIATED RPC. SECOND RPC AL_WS CONTI_ED









































MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
FAILS ON












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CONTROL BUS
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILING IN THE ON POSITION HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE
OR MISSION. THE USE OF OTHER COCKPIT SWITCHES AND CIRCUIT





































ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CONTROL BUS
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATo: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT AVIONICS BAY 4, AFT AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: AR3, AR6, AR3-AR5, AR4, AR5, AR21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER FAILING OFF HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE
OR MISSION. DEVICE IS USED TO DRIVE FLIGHT DECK TALKBACK
INDICATORS. LOSS OF ONE DEVICE REDUCES REDUNDANCY, SECOND DEVICE
WILL DRIVE TALKBACK. STATUS OF CENTERLINE LATCHES AND
READY-TO-LATCH SWITCHES IS ALSO AVAILABLE FROM TELEMETRY AND GPC
TM.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099






























SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AVIONICS BAY 4, AFT AVIONICS BAY 5
AR3, AR6, AR3-AR5, AR4, AR5, AR21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER FAILING ON HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS BEFORE DUAL MOTOR OPERATION TIME HAS
ELAPSED A PR__ TALKBACK INDICATION WOULD OCCUR. SINCE
TELEMETRY AND GPC TM WOULD NOT CONFIRM FUNCTION HAD BEEN




















































ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE CAUSES A LOSS OF INPUT TO LOGIC GATES.
LOSS OF A LOGIC GATE CAUSES A LOSS OF AN ACTUATING MOTOR.
REDUNDANT DIODE WILL ALLOW CONTINUED ACTUATOR MOTOR OPERATION,
FUNCTION WILL BE COMPLETED BUT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES'. VS70-560109, VS72-956099































ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED OUT DIODE HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. IN
MANUAL MODE FOR CLOSING AND LATCHING THE ET UMBILICAL DOORS A
SHORTED DIODE WOULD ALLOW POWER TO REACH THE LOGIC CIRCUIT FOR
THE OPPOSITE _NCTION, SINCETHER WOULD BE NO INPUTS TO THE
LOGIC GATES THE FAILURE DOES NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT. THE SAME










































SHORTS, RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR THAT SHORTS OR WITH RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
WOULD ALLOW EXCESSIVE CURRENT TO REACH OTHER COMPONENTS. CURRENT
WOULD BE MORE THAN COMPONENTS WERE DESIGNED FOR. HIGHER CURRENT
CAUSES LOSS OF COMPONENTS AND LOSS OF FUNCTION. REDUNDANT
ELEMENTS WILL CONTINUE OPERATION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099




























ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION' MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR FAILURE AS AN OPEN CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF CURRENT
TO OTHER COMPONENTS. THIS RESULTS IN A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WHEN
AFFECTED COMPONENT CANNOT OPERATE. REDUNDANT ELEMENTS WILL






















REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-300 m
i
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: RESISTANCE HIGHER THAN RATED VALUE












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTANCE HIGHER THAN RATED VALUE CAUSES A LOSS OF CURRENT.
INPUT TO LOGIC GATE WOULD BE LESS THAN NOMINAL CAUSING A FALSE
OUTPUT. RELAY WOULD NOT BE CLOSED CAUSING A LOSS OF A ACTUATOR
MOTOR. REDUNDANT ELEMENT WOULD CONTINUE OPERATION WITH FUNCTION
CONTINUING AT A SLOWER RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-301
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: FUSE, IA, TO ACTUATOR STATUS SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: BLOWN ..... i _ _ _













AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FUSE, IA, TO ACTUATOR STATUS SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
FI, F4, F2, FI, F3, F2, F6, FS, F6, FI, F5, F7
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE FAILURE CAUSES AN OPEN CIRCUIT, EFFECT IS A LOSS OF INPUT
TO LOGIC CIRCUIT CONTROLLING AC POWER RELAYS TOACTUATOI_MOTOR.
OPEN CIRCUIT WILL SIGNAL PREMATURE COMPLETION OF ACTUATOR
FUNCTION. REDUNDANT MOTOR WILL COMPLETE FUNCTION BUT AT A
REDUCED RATE. WILL GET PREMATURE TELEMETRY INDICATION OF
ACTUATOR STATUS FROM ONE PART OF PAIR. NO EFFECT ON CREW VEHICLE
OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099




































ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS, RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE












ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
CONTROL BUS
RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR THAT SHORTS OR WITH RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
WOULD ALLOW EXCESSIVE CURRENT TO REACH RPC. THIS CAUSES RPC
CURRENT LIMITING TO TRIP OUT. RPC LOSS CAUSES LOSS OF AMC AND
ASSOCIATED MOTOR RELAYS. REDUNDANT ELEMENTS WOULD CONTINUE
OPERATION WITH FUNCTION COMPLETED AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT
ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-303
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
OPEN CIRCUIT ....











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
CONTROL BUS
RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
RESISTOR FAILURE AS AN OPEN CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF INPUT
TO ASSOCIATED RPC. LOSS OF RPC IN TURN CAUSES LOSS OF AMC AND
ASSOCIATED MOTOR RELAYS. REDUNDANT ELEMENTS WOULD CONTINUE
OPERATION WITH FUNCTION COMPLETED AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT
























KU-BAND DEPLOY ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
C-305































































































































INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
INPUT/OUTPUT S_FT - HOUSING
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 2)
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 2)
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($5 & 6)
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($5 & 6)
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY














































































































K-J-BAND DEPLOY ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P




3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P Y P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P Y P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P






























































































KU-BAND DEPLOY ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS _ _ _...._
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
3/IR /NA P F P
312R /NA P F P
3/2R /NAP F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P FP
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA p F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P F P









3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
















































































KU-BAND DEPLOY ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC- ID H/F H/F A B C
4623 3/3 /NA
4624 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4625 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4626 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4627 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4628 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4629 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4630 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4631 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4632 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4633 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4634 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4635 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4636 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4637 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4638 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4639 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4640 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4641 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4642 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4643 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4644 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4645 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4646 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4647 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4648 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4649 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4650 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4651 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4652 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4653 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4654 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4655 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4656 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4657 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4658 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4659 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4660 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4661 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4662 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4663 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4664 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4665 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4666 * 3/1R /NA P F P








40 MS TIME DELAY





4 SECOND TIME DELAY











40 MS TIME DELAY





4 SECOND TIME DELAY
















(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-309





















KU-BAND DEPLOY ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/iR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/IS /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA .... P F P
313 ....
3/3 INA
311R INA P F P













































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: i/I
MDAC ID: 4101 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: GUILLOTINE/PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS MID-TRAVEL, FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE),
PARTIAL OUTPUT

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO PROPERLY SECURE/EJECT THE ANTENNA. ANTENNA WOULD BE
SECURED BY ONLY THE CABLE OR PARTIAL CABLE. EVA WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO SEVER THE CABLE AND EJECT THE DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM OR
PROPERLY SECURE THE DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-311
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: PREMA_ OPERATION _ .......

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE,
ACCELERATION, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF KU-BAND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM. DEPENDING ON MISSION
REQUIREMENTS, COULD _AN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 4103 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: NUT/BREECH
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING, RESTRICTED FLOW, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE),
PARTIAL OUTPUT











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
KU-BAND ANTENNA
SKD26100105-501/601
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, JAMMED
w
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO PROPERLY SECURE/EJECT THE ANTENNA. EVA WORK AROUND




REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64













FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OPERATION ................

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 2/2 RTLS : 1/1
LI FTOFF" 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO : 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE,
ACCELERATION, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
UNABLE TO PROPERLY SECURE/EJECT THE ANTENNA. ANTENNA WOULD BE
SECURED-BY-ONL_ THE CABLE OR PARTIAL CABLE. EVA WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO SEVER THE CABLE AND EJECT THE DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM OR
PROPERLY SECURE THE DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,







































INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, ACCCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DEPLOY/STOW THE ANTENNA.
SYSTEM POSSIBLY PLBD CLOSURE.
INHIBIT KU-BAND COMMUNICATION
w
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-315
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDACID: 4106 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
FAIL U_MODE: FAILS TO START/STOPAS CORDED & ROTATES FREELY
IN DEPLOYMENT PLANE.











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, ACCCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DEPLOY/STOW THE ANTENNA.














REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 4107 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 2) ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE
OPERATION, SHORTED












KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




S 1 & 2, V070-544903
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES ANTENNA STOWED WHEN IT MAY BE DEPLOYED.
ANTENNA IS DEPLOYED, STOW CAPABILITY WOULD BE INHIBITED.
IF THE
REFERENCES: V070-54490i,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-317
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 4108 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 2) ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PREMATURE
OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)












KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (Sl & S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




S 1 & 2, V070-544903
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES ANTENNA NOT STOWED WHEN IT MAY BE PROPERLY
SECURED. _ MOTORS WOULD CONTINUE TO TURN UNTIL OFF COMMAND IS
TRANSMITTED. CREW WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DETERMINE CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4109 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($5 & 6)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE
OPERATION, SHORTED












KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($5 & 6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




S5 & $6, V070-54903
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES ANTENNA DEPLOYED WHEN IT MAY BE STOWED. IF THE
ANTENNA IS STOWED, DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY WOULD BE INHIBITED. IF
THE ANTENNA IS PARTIALLY DEPLOYED AND KU POWER ON POSSIBLE
ORBITER IMPACT WITH ANTENNA INITIALIZATION INITIATION.
n
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002' VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
u
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-319
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4110 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($5 & 6)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PREMATURE
OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)












KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S5 & 6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY ....
PART NUMBER: $5 & $6, V070-54903
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES ANTENNA NOT DEPLOYED WHEN IT MAY BE DEPLOYED.
MOTORS WOULD CONTINUE TO TURN UNTIL OFF COMMAND IS TRANSMITTED.

















REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-000_, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64 u
m






















PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
JAMMED, FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO STOW/DEPLOY ANTENNA.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64


















FAILS TO REMAIN IN POSITION, FREELY ROTATES
SUBSYSLEAD: H.J. LOWERYLEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL
FAILU_2 VIBRATION, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO STOW OR DEPLOY ANTENNA.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,






































ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 4101 - 4112
ALL FAILURE MODES












KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
ALL REMAINING PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 4101 - 4112
CAUSES: ALL CAUSES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 4101 - 4112 WILL HAVE
NO EFFECT ON MISSION, VEHICLE OR CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART _BER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS .DC .SW. DS .OP. CNI





































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW. DS.OP.CNI




















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OP.CN2






































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OP.CN2




















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OP.CN3


































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OP.CN3




























LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OP.CN4



































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:














REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-331
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED


































ITEM: +28V CONTACT #I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]







C [ P ]




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-333
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHYz
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL






SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT _FAILURES__ COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED




















































































DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL R13A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:





































SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED












































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN3




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
w
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :




































ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN4




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
n
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCO_DED

































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-341
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 4518 ABORT: /
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGO_RY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN2
c[p]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCO_DED







































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-343
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED





I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL









SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED










































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:












ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED



















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED








































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:














































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CNI






























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES"
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN2































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-351
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























SUBSYS LEAD: H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN3
c [ ]




































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
=...
REFERENCES:
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL






SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: _ / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN4










































































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:


















FAILS SHORTED _ _L u_r
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3 ) EI__CTRI CAL







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT








































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL



















C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CNI




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-357
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL R13A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT











































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CN2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:



















_ _ _ _t_ _






























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT







































































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CN3




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:






















































A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT





































ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN


















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS. DC.SW. DGS.SP. CN4





















T._AD _ALYST: A.D. MONTGO_RY
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
i) MEC_ICAL AC_ATION SYSTEM
2) _-B_D DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ET_CTRICAL



















REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
_CATION: DISP_Y _D CONTROL P_EL RI3A2
P_T _BER: KBS.DC.SW._S.TB
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:














































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.TB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TALKBACK MAY NOT SHOW CORRECT STATUS.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-365
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO STOW
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :














SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /:
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW. DGS.TB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/I_.TIONALE:











































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-367
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSME_NT










ITEM: AND GATE #I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AGI































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
















ITEM: AND GATE #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AG2








































































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.EP.AGI




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:



















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: •
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.EP.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
































ITEM: AND GATE #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED





























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.EP.AG2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
B












ITEM: AND GATE #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.EP.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT ....























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AMI











































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT





















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDO_HIERARCHY:

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AM2















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM





















C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS .MC2. STW. AM1




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
m
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NQI_MMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT






































FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AM2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY!














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT ....














































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.KI4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT



















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN





























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.KI4

































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K68
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT

















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K68




















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K72




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
u
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-387
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ..... ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K72
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT









































































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K70




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-389
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: i / _ ATO: 7-i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K70
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT





































































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.SMS.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE MOTOR DURING STOW OPERATIONS.






















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.SMS.I




















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:









SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: KBS.DMS.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE MOTOR DURING DEPLOY OPERATIONS.











ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
° _
CRITICALITIES






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DMS.I















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
_mm
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-395
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AGI

































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-397
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: AND GATE #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / i RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: / ......
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AG2





















































































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AGI








REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-399
E_: i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AGI
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PiECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT








































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AG2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
w
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-401
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: AND GATE #2
FAILURE MODE: FAI_ OPEN
T._AD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS _AD: H.J. LO_RY
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:














FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F_C
PRE_UNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF : _ / TAL: - / _
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUCTU_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
NO I_DIATE EFFECT_ ....SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT


























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LA/_DING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-403
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. MC4. STW. AM1































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-405
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AM2


















































































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AM1




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
L
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-407
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT






































FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED





























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AM2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
w


















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT









































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K25
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT

















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN





























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K25

















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
_NORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
m_
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-413
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / ....... RTLS: ........./ _ii
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















































l) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K27





















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN





























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K27
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K37








REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-417
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K37
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT











































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.SMS.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE MOTOR DURING STOW OPERATIONS.
COULD PREVENT STOWAGE OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES
REFERENCES:






























SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.SMS.2






























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
12_NDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. DMS. 2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE MOTOR DURING DEPLOY OPERATIONS. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES
COULD PREVENT DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:



















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DMS.2














































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
























LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CNI


















































































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:












































































































































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-427
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CN3















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL



















C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:


















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL






SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES












A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CN4





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.SP.CNI



































































































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :




































REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-433
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.SP.CN2









































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.SP.CN3





















































































































































ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN










































































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.JP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-439
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.JP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

















































































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.JP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.JP.CN2





















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.SP.CNI


























LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.SP.CNI












































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.SP.CN2



























































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.SP.CN2






































































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AGI




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
u














































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AGI















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






















C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AG2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:














































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AG2












































40 MS TIME DELAY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. LCI. MTD



























40 MS TIME DELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.MTD




































ITEM: ' AMP #I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AMI




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:













FAILURE MODE: FAI_ OPEN
T._AD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AMI

















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AG3




























7._AD _ALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM















REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. _WERY


























































4 SECOND TIME DELAY
FAILS SHORTED



































SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
m

















4 SECOND TIME DELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :

























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.STD















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. LC 1. AM3









REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-459
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:







































































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.GP.EI




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
=
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-461
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY






C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.GP.EI













































































C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.NP.EI


























































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.NP.EI
















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AGI








REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-465
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AGI














































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AG2








REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-467
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AG2













































40 MS TIME DELAY
FAILS SHORTED




























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. LC3. MTD




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
u

















40 MS TIME DELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.MTD






















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






















C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AMI

























FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AMI













































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





































REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-473
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AG3



















































4 SECOND TIME DELAY
FAILS SHORTED

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.STD


























4 SECOND TIME DELAY
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HiE_CHY: ....._ _:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / - RTLS: / -
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
_DiNG/SAFING: / ........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.STD














































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AM3









REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-477
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. LC3. AM3











































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.GP.EI
B [ F ] c[P]




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
L
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-479
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.GP.EI



















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.NP.EI








REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-481
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.NP.EI












































FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AM2




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-483
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AM2























































































SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:










































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AM2

















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.CON




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
w



















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














































































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.IAG








REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-489
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.IAG















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.CB





























LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.CB

































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS :










C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.AG
























































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.AG








































FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.AMP




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-495
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.AMP















































_AD _ALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. _WERY
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:


























C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER: KBS.LCI.PIC.TL









REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-497
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION."
PART NUMBER: KBS. LCI. PIC. TL



















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :


























C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.CON








REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-499
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















T._AD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. _RY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.CON














































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

































SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
w




















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.IAG













































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.CB




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-503
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.CB










































FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
































C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.AG




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
m
REFERENCES:















































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.AG













































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.AMP







REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-507
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.AMP











































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.TL



























LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.TL




SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:


































PAYLOAD BAY DOORS ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
5101 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
5102 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5103 3/3 3/3
5104 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5105 3/3 3/3
5106 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5107 * 1/1 1/1
5108 * 2/1R 2/1R P F P
5109 * 1/1 1/i
511o • i/1 1/1
5111 * 1/l i/1
5112 * I/i i/i
5113 * i/i i/I
5114 * i/i 1/1
5115 * 1/1 1/1
5116 3/3 3/3
5117 3/2R 3/2R P P P
5118 3/3 /NA
5119 * 2/1R /NA P P P
5120 * 1/1 1/1
5121 * 1/1 1/1
5122 * 1/1 1/1
5123 • 2/1R 2/IR P N P
5124 3/3 /NA
5125 _* 2/IR 2/IR P N P
5126 3/3 3/3
5127 * 2/1R /NA P N F
5128 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5129 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5130 * 2/1R 2/1R P N F
5131 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5132 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5133 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5134 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5135 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5136 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5137 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5138 * 2/IR 2/1R P N P
5139 * 2/1R /NA P N P
5140 * 2/IR 2/IR P N P
5141 3/3 3/3
5142 3/3 /NA
5143 * 2/IR /NA P P P
5144 3/3 /NA

















CL/BLKHD SWITCH OPEN LIMIT
CL/BLKHD SWITCH OPEN LIMIT
CL/BLKHD CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH






CL LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY
CL LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
BULKHEAD LATCH GANG BELLCRANK








BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH

































PAYLOAD BAY DOORS ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC- I D H/F H/F A B C
_Emi_
5146 * 2/IR 2/1R P P P
5147 * 2/1R 2/IR P F P
5148 313 313
5149 * 211R 211R P F P
5150 313 313
5151 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5152 * 1/1 1/1
5153 * 2/2 2/2
5154 * i/1 I/i
5155 * i/i i/i
5156 * i/i 1/l
5157 * 2/2 2/2
5158 * 1/i 1/1
5159 * 2/IR 2/1R P N F
5160 * 1/1 1/1
5161 * 1/1 1/1
5162 3/IR 3/IR P N P
5163 * i/i 1/1
5164 * 1/i 1/1
5165 * 1/1 1/1
5166 * 1/1 i/1
5167 * 2/IR 2/IR P N P
5168 * I/i 1/1
5169 3/IR 3/IR P N P
5170 3/3 3/3
5171 3/2R 3/2R P P P
5172 3/3 /NA
5173 3/3 /NA
5174 * 1/1 1/1
5175 * i/i 1/1
5176 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5177 3/IR 3/IR P N P
5178 313 313
5179 3/IR 3/IR P N P
5501 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5502 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5503 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5504 * 2/1R 2/1R P P P
5505 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
5506 * 2/1R 2/1R P P P




5511 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
ITEM NAME
m
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MOTOR
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE





PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE TORQUE
PBD DRIVE SUPPORT ASSEMBLY
PBD DRIVE SUPPORT ASSEMBLY
PBD DRIVE SUPPORT ASSEMBLY
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PAYLOA£ BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE
PBD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
PBD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
PBD 88 DEG LIMIT SWITCH




PBD ALIGNMENT ROLLER GUIDE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR PASSIVE STOP
PBD SHEAR/FLOATING HINGE
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
PBD CONTROL SWITCH
FUSE, IA
PBD MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
DIODE
DIODE
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-513




H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
5512 313 3/3
5513 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
55i4 * _ " 2/IR 2/iR _ P F P
5515 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5516 * 2/iR 2/IR P N P
5517 * 2/1R 2/IR P P P
5518 3/3 3/3
5519 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
PAY_AD_BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH










































LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM



























B [ P ] C [ P ]
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF A MOTOR WOULD RESULT IN LATCHING/UNLATCHNING TAKING A
LONGER TIME. THE LOSS OF THE REDUNDANT MOTOR ON A CENTERLINE
LATCH GANG IS MORE SERIOUS THAN FOR THE BULKHEAD LATCH GANG. THE
FAILURE TO LATCH A BULKHEAD GANG (4 LATCHES) STILL ALLOWS
FOR A SAFE ENTRY• ONLY 2 CENTERLINE LATCHES, EXCEPT FOR THE 15-
16 PAIR, CAN BE UNLATCHED FOR A SAFE ENTRY. FAILURE TO UNLATCH A
GANG WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING AND CAUSES A LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-515
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILS TO ENGAGE












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /




STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CLUTCH TO ENGAGE WHEN POWER APPLIED WOULD PREVENT THE
MOTOR SHAFT FROM ROTATING. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD COMPLETE
LATCH UNLATCHING BUT AT A SLOWER RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE
OR MISSION.











































CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILS TO DISENGAGE












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /




STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE CLUTCH TO DISENGAGE WOULD ALLOW THE MOTOR SHAFT TO
ROTATE INSTEAD OF BEING STOPPED. SINCE THIS OCCURS AFTER
LATCH/UNLATCHING THIS HAS MINIMAL IMPACT. THE FAILURE WOULD BE
IMPORTANT IF THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR ALSO WERE TO FAIL. THIS WOULD
CAUSE A LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL AND THE LOSS OF A
LATCH GANG.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039

















CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE











PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/iR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO DISENGAGE WHEN POWER IS APPLIED WOULD PREVENT
THE MOTOR SHAFT FROM ROTATING. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD COMPLETE













































CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE
FAILS TO ENGAGE











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
B [ ] C [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECT OF BRAKE FAILING TO ENGAGE WOULD BE THAT THE MOTOR SHAFT
WOULD STILL BE ABLE TO ROTATE INSTEAD OF BEING LOCKED, SINCE THIS
OCCURS AFTER LATCHING/UNLATCHING THIS HAS MINIMAL IMPACT. THIS
FAILURE WOULD BE IMPORTANT IF THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR ALSO WERE
TO FAIL WHICH WOULD THEN RESULT IN THE REDUNDANT MOTOR
BACKDRIVING THE FAILED ONE WHICH WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF OUTPUT
FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL AND LOSS OF A LATCH GANG.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
L





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC
SLIPS
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SLIPPING OF THE CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC WOULD REDUCE THE INPUT TO THE
DIFFERENTIAL AND THE RATE OF LATCH GANG OPEN/CLOSING. REDUNDANT
MOTOR WOULD SUPPLY LATCH OPERATION POWER. LOSS OF MOTOR ALONG
WITH CLUTCH/BRAKEIFAILURE WOULD PERMIT BACKDRIVING BY
REMAINING MOTOR, NO OUTPUT FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.











































CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /




STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE EFFECT OF THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THE INABILITY TO
LATCH/UNLATCH A CENTER/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG. IF UNABLE TO UNLATCH
A GANG WHEN OPENING THE PBD THEN A LOSS OF MISSION RESULTS. IF
UNABLE TO LATCH A CENTERLINE LATCH GANG THEN AN UNSAFE CONDITION
WOULD
EXIST ON ENTRY. AN EVA CAPABILITY EXISTS TO SECURE TWO FAILED
LATCHES. BULKHEAD LATCH GANG CAN FAIL OPEN AND LEAVE SUFFICIENT
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY FOR A SAFE ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
















CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
PARTIAL OUTPUT












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /








CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, PARTIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF OUTPUT OF TORQUE FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL WAS LOW ENOUGH THE
SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME LIMIT WOULD BE HIT. THE COMBINATION OF
EXCESSIVE TIME AND NO VISUAL CUE OF WHETHER THE CENTERLINE LATCH
HOOKS ARE CLEAR OF THE ROLLERS WOULD END PBD OPENING CAUSING A
LOSS OF MISSION. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE CENTERLINE LATCH GANG THE
POSSIBILITY EXISTS OF LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. AN EVA COULD BE
PERFORMED TO SECURE 2 OF THE 4 LATCHES IN A GANG WHICH WOULD
ALLOW A SAFE ENTRY. A SAFE ENTRY CAN BE MADE WITH A BULKHEAD GANG
FAILED OPEN. VISUAL CUES AS TO THE STATE OF THE BULKHEAD LATCHES
ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039, FLIGHT RULES SECTION 10-
MMACS












































CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: I/I
LANDING/SAFING: /




STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE EFFECT OF THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THE INABILITY TO
LATCH/UNLATCH A CENTER/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG. IF UNABLE TO UNLATCH
A GANG WHEN OPENING THE PBD THEN A LOSS OF MISSION RESULTS. IF
UNABLE TO LATCH A CENTERLINE LATCH GANG THEN AN UNSAFE CONDITION
WOULD
EXIST ON ENTRY. AN EVA CAPABILITY EXISTS TO SECURE TWO FAILED
LATCHES. BULKHEAD LATCH GANG CAN FAIL OPEN AND LEAVE SUFFICIENT
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY FOR A SAFE ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039



























SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD TORQUE LIMITER ........:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TORQUE LIMITER TO SLIP DUE TO EXCESSIVE TORQUE COULD
CAUSE COMPONENTS TO BREAK OR BE DAMAGED. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION IFUNAB_ TO OPEN BPD AND LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF UNABLE
TO CLOSE PBD BECAUSE OF JAMMED OR BROKEN COMPONENTS. EVA
CAPABILITY EXISTS TO CLOSE PBDS. CENTERLINE LATCH GANG MUST BE
LATCHED FOR A SAFE ENTRY, BULKHEAD GANG CAN FAIL OPEN FOR A SAFE
ENTRY.


































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 5111 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD TORQUE LIMITER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, SLIPS AT LESS THAN MINIMUM
ALLOWABLE LIMIT












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /




STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TORQUE LIMITER SLIPPING AT LESS THAN THE MINIMUM SPECIFIED LIMIT
COULD CAUSE A LATCH GANG TO NOT LATCH/UNLATCH. THE FAILURE TO
LATCH A BULKHEAD LATCH GANG STILL ALLOWS MARGIN FOR A SAFE ENTRY.
THE FAILURE OF A CENTERLINE LATCH GANG LOWERS THE
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE ORBITER LEADING TO A POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. EVA CAN BE PERFORMED TO SECURE A FAILED LATCH.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-525
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 5112 ABORT: i/i_
ITEM: CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD TORQUE LIMITER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, DOES NOT SLIP AT MAXIMUM
A£L_WABLE LIMIT ..........











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO LATCH LINKAGES, TORQUE SHAFT OR POWER DRIVE
UNIT COULD OCCUR IF TORQUE LIMITER DOES NOT SLIP WHEN A JAM
OCCURS. FAILURE OF A CENTERLINE LATCH TORQUE SHAFT COULD FAIL
THE ENTIRE GANG IN THE UNLATCHED POSITION WHICH IS UNACCEPTABLE
FOR
ENTRY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF ANY DAMAGE SEVERE
ENOUGH.












































FAILS TO TRANSFER MOTOR OUTPUT












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: !/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: I/I
LANDING/SAFING: /




STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF GEARBOX WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A LATCH GANG. LOSS OF
MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF THIS HAPPENED WHEN OPENING PBD AND LATCHES
WERE NOT CLEAR OF ROLLERS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG COULD NOT BE LATCHED AND CREW DOES NOT
DETECT THIS. THERE IS AN EVA PROCEDURE TO SECURE FAILED LATCHES.



































PAY_AD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CE_ERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /




STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPE_TURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE _SS OF A LATCH GANG. LOSS OF MISSION
WOULD OCCUR IF THIS _PPENED WHEN OPENING PBD AND LATCHES _RE
NOT CLEAR OF ROLLERS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF
CENTERLINE _TCH GANG COULD NOT BE LATCHED. EVA PROCEDURE EXISTS
TO SECURE FAILED LATCHES.





















































PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /




STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INSUFFICIENT OUTPUT WOULD NOT FULLY LATCH/UNLATCH A GANG. SINGLE
MOTOR DRIVE TIME WOULD BE REACHED BEFORE FULL LATCH TRAVEL
COMPLETED. VISUAL CUES ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE BULKHEAD LATCHES
BUT NOT THE CENTERLINE ONES. FAILURE TO LATCH A CENTERLINE GANG
COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. FAILURE TO UNLATCH A
GANG WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF MISSION.
m
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-529
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWICH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER: MC452-0123
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECT WOULD BE THAT THE MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO RUN. WITH TWO
MOTORS OPERATING THE LATCHES WOULD REACHED THE OPEN POSITION,
TORQUE LIMITERS WOULD SLIP WHEN LINKAGES JAM. SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE







































CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWICH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /




STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
M452-0123
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMIT SWITCH PREMATURELY GOING TO THE OPEN POSITION WOULD SHUT
OFF A MOTOR. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE OPENING THE LATCH
GANG AT A REDUCED RATE. FAILURE OF BOTH SWITCHES WOULD PREVENT
PBD OPENING CAUSING LOSS OF MISSION. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
i





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH _ _












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWICH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
M452-0123
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECT WOULD BE THAT THE MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO RUN. WITH TWO
MOTORS OPERATING THE LATCHES WOULD REACH THE CLOSED POSITION,
TORQUE LIMITERS WOULD SLIP WHEN LINKAGES JAM. SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE
TIME WOULD BE REACHED. NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
















































CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWICH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
M452-0123
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMIT SWITCH PREMATURELY GOING TO THE CLOSED POSITION WOULD SHUT
OFF A MOTOR. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE CLOSING THE LATCH
GANG AT A REDUCED RATE. FAILURE OF BOTH SWITCHES WOULD PREVENT
PBD CLOSURE CAUSING A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. AN EVA
CAPABILITY IS ON HAND TO MANUALLY SECURE A FAILED LATCH.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039

















CENTERLINE LATCH GANG TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLINGS
BROKEN












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF" / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-594345-001 TO -009, V070-594325-001, V070-
594326-001, V070-594347-001, V070-594350-001, V070-59354-001 & -
002, +MISC.
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
STRIPPED CROWN SPINLINE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLING WOULD PREVENT A LATCH OR TWO LATCHES
FROM LATCH/UNLATCHING. WHEN OPENING PBD THIS WOULD PREVENT
OPENING AND CAUSE A LOSS OF MISSION. FAILURE AFTER LATCH HOOK
CLEARS ROLLER OR WHEN LATCHING PBD CLOSED COULD CAUSE A POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. LATCH PAIR 15-16 MUST BE CLOSED TO HAVE A
FACTOR OF SAFETY GREATER THAN i. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF VEHICLE
IS LOWERED WITH A LATCH PAIR FAILED.












































CENTERLINE LATCH GANG TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLINGS
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: 1/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-594345-001 TO -009, V070-594325-001, V070-
594326-001, V070-594347-001, V070-594350-001, V070-59354-001 & -
002, +MISC.
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, SEIZED BUSHING, PBD WARPED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING TORQUE SHAFT COUPLING WOULD PREVENT A LATCH OR
TWO LATCHES FROM LATCH/UNLATCHING. WHEN OPENING PBD THIS WOULD
PREVENT OPENING ANDCAUSE A LOSS OF MISSION. FAILURE AFTER LATCH
HOOK CLEARS ROLLER OR WHEN LATCHING PBD CLOSED COULD CAUSE A
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. LATCH PAIR 15-16 MUST BE CLOSED
TO HAVE A FACTOROF SAFETYGREATER THAN i. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
OF VEHICLE IS LOWERED WITH A LATCH PAIR FAILED,
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-535
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG LATCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATOi I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-594306-001, V070-594307-001 & -002, V070-
594341-001, V070-594357-002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, PBD WARPED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF LATCH ASSEMBLY BEFORE LATCH OPENED WOULD
PREVENT PBD OPENING CAUSING A LOSS OF MISSION. IF OCCURS AFTER
LATCH HOOK CLEARED ROLLER OR WHEN CLOSING PBD THE TORQUE LIMITER
WOULD SLIP DUE TO THE JAM. THIS WOULD ALSO PREVENT THE OTHER 3
LATCHES FROM MOVING. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.



















































PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG LATCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-594306-001, V070-594307-001 & -002, V070-
594341-001, V070-594357-002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, MATERIAL FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN LINK OR BELLCRANK WOULD PREVENT TORQUE SHAFT ROTATION FROM
MOVING THE LATCH HOOK TO THE OPEN POSITION POSSIBLY PREVENTING
PBD OPENING CAUSING A LOSS OF MISSION. BROKEN LINK, BELLCRANK OR
LATCH WOULD PREVENT CLOSING OF A LATCH. SAFE ENTRY CAN BE
MADE WITH A SINGLE LATCH NOT ENGAGED, SOME LOSS OF STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
t
w















_TCH HOOK FAILS TO ENGAGE ROLLER











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. _RY
MEC_ICAL AC_ATION SYSTEM
PAY_AD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE _TCH MEC_ISM ...............
CENTERLI_ _TCH GANG _TCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRE_UNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: /
REDUND_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: ST_BO_D PBD




_TCH HOOK FAILING TO ENGAGE ROLLER WHEN C_SING PBD WOULD CAUSE
_SS OF T_T _TCH. SAFE ENTRY CAN BE _DE WITH A SINGLE _TCH
NOT ENGAGED, SOME _SS OF STRUCTU_L INTEGRITY. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHIC_.









































CENTERLINE LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF THE ROLLER ASSEMBLY WHEN OPENING A LATCH
CAUSES TORQUE LIMITER TO ENGAGE AND A LOSS OF MISSION WHEN PBD
CANNOT BE OPENED. SAME SITUATION OCCURRING WHEN CLOSING COULD
PREVENT A LATCH GANG FROM ENGAGING AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. EVA CAPABILITY EXISTS TO SECURE FAILED LATCHES.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-539
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT:
MDACID: 5126 ABORT:

















PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN ROLLER ASSEMBLY PREVENTS HOOK ENGAGING ROLLER. RESULT IS
DECREASED VEHICLE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY DUE TO A LATCH MISSING BUT
SAFE ENTRY IS POSSIBLE. NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.










































PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
FAILS TO ENGAGE CLAW












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-594302-001, -002, -003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, MISADJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SHEAR FITTING ROLLER TO ENGAGE CLAW COULD PREVENT BPD
CLOSURE. IF PBD CAN BE CLOSED IT WOULD DEGRADE STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY OF VEHICLE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF MORE THAN
ONE FAILS TO ENGAGE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
w

















PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
BROKEN
7_AD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LORRY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRELAUNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN ROLLER WOULD DEGRADE VEHICLE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. SHEAR
LOAD CARRIED BY THIS FITTING WOULD BE CARRIED BY _MAINING

















REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040 I
i
m




















PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING ROLLER PREVENTS MOVEMENT OF ROLLER OUT OR INTO
CLAW. LOSS OF MISSION IF PBD CANNOT BE OPENED. LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE IF ROLLER WILL NOT ENGAGE CLAW AND STOPS DOOR
CLOSURE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040

















PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
FAILS TO ENGAGE ROLLER












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-59375-001, V070-594376-001, V070-594378-001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, MISA_DJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SHEAR FITTING CLAW TO ENGAGE ROLLER COULD PREVENT PBD
CLOSURE. IFPBDCANB_CLOSE_ IT_WOULD DEGRADE STRUCTURAL





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT:






PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
BROKEN












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN CLAW WOULD DEGRADE VEHICLE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. SHEAR
LOAD CARRIED BY THIS FITTING WOULD CARRIED BY REMAINING FITTINGS.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IN THE EVENT OF MULTIPLE FAILURES.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
m

















PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
BENT












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-59375-001, V070-594376-001, V070-594378-001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BENT CLAW WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING/CLOSING. IF ROLLER CANNOT
FOLLOW NOMINAL TRAJECTORY AS PBD OPENS A JAM WOULD OCCUR
RESULTING IN A LOSS OF MISSION. IF ROLLER CANNOT SEAT IN CLAW,



















REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-O040 g
D
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BULKHEAD LATCH GANG BELLCRANK LINKAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD LATCH BELLCRANK LINKAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594163-001 & -002, V070-594165-001 & -002,
V070594167-001, V070-594223-001, V070-594263-005 & -006, V070-
594265-005 & -006, V070-594267-001 & -002, AND MISC.
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF BELLCRANK OR LINK WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING
CAUSING A LOSS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER LATCHES CLEAR
ROLLERS OR WHEN CLOSING PBD A SAFE ENTRY IS POSSIBLE. FAILURE
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF i, 2 OR 3 LATCHES DEPENDING ON THE
LOCATION OF THE FAILURE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNLESS TWO
GANGS FAIL. VEHICLE LOSES SOME STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WITH ONE
GANG FAILED.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-547
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















BU_EAD _TCH GANG BELLC_K LINAGE
BROWN











SUBSYS _AD: H.J. _WERY
_C_ICAL AC_ATION SYSTEM
PAY_AD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BUL_EAD _TCH MEC_ISM
BU_EAD _TCH BELLC_K LINAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRE_UNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
_DING/SAFING: /
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
_CATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BUL_EAD
P_T _BER: V070-594163-001 & -002, V070-594165-001 & -002,
V070594!67TQ01, V070-594223,001 , V070-594263-005 & -006, V070-
594265-005 & -006, V070-594267-001 & -002, AND MISC.
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-P_T FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
BROKEN BELLC_NK, LINK OR ASSOCIATED HARDW_E WOULD P_NT PBD
OPENING CAUSING A _SS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER
_TCHES CLEAR ROLLERS OR _EN CLOSING PB_D-kSAFE ENTRY IS
POSSIB_. FAILURE COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF I, 2 OR 3 _TCHES
DEPENDING
ON THE _CATION OF THE FAILLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/_HICLE _SS
_O G_GS FAIL. VEHICLE LOSES SO_ STRUCT_L INTEGRITY WITH ONE
G_G FAI_D.






















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
V070-594220, AND MISC.
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF PUSHROD WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING CAUSING A
LOSS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER LATCHES CLEAR ROLLERS
OR WHEN CLOSING PBD A SAFE ENTRY IS POSSIBLE. FAILURE COULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF i, 2 OR 3 LATCHES DEPENDING ON THE LOCATION OF
THE FAILURE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNLESS TWO GANGS FAIL.
VEHICLE LOSES SOME STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WITH ONE GANG FAILED.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
E












ITEM: BULKHEAD PUSH-PULL ROD
FAILURE MODE: BROKEN
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
V070-594220, AND MISC.
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN PUSHROD OR ASSOCIATED HARDWARE WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING
CAUSING A LOSS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER LATCHES CLEAR
ROLLERS OR WHEN CLOSING PBD A SAFE ENTRY IS POSSIBLE. FAILURE
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF I, 2 OR 3 LATCHES DEPENDING ON THE
LOCATION OF THE FAILURE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNLESS TWO
GANGS FAIL. VEHICLE LOSES SOME STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WITH ONE
GANG FAILED.


























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594280, V070-594276 THRU V070-594279, V070-
594281 THRU V070-594284, V070-594314, V070-594315, V070-594319,
V070-594316, V070-594317, V070-594320
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF LATCHING BELLCRANK, LINK OR HOOK WOULD PREVENT
PBD OPENING CAUSING A LOSS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER
LATCHES CLEAR ROLLERS OR WHEN CLOSING PBD A SAFE ENTRY IS
POSSIBLE. FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF i, 2, 3 OR 4 LATCHES
DEPENDING ON THE LOCATION OF THE FAILURE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE UNLESS TWO GANGS FAIL. VEHICLE LOSES SOME
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WITH ONE GANG FAILED.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039



































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE_UNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
_DING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART _BER: V070-594280, V070-594276 THRU V070-594279, V070-
594281 THRU V070-594284, V070-594314, V070-594315, V070-594319,
V070-594316, V070-594317, V070-594320
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-P_T FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TiONALE:
BROKEN BELLC_NK, LINK OR HOOK WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING CAUSING
A LOSS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER LATCHES CLEAR ROLLERS
OR HEN CLOSING PBD A SAFE ENTRY IS POSSIBLE. FAILURE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF I, 2, 3 OR 4 LATCHES DEPENDING ON THE LOCATION
OF THE FAILURE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNT_SS TWO BANGS FAIL.
VEHICLE LOSESSOME STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WITH ONE GANG FAILED.

































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594280, V070-594276 THRU V070-594279, V070-
594281 THRU V070-594284, V070-594314, V070-594315, V070-594319,
V070-594316, V070-594317, V070-594320
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
MISRIGGED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO LATCH REDUCES STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE. AN
ENTIRE BULKHEAD LATCH GANG CAN FAIL BUT STILL ALLOW A SAFE ENTRY.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
w
































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594180, V070-594280
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
MISADJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........
BINDING/JAMMING OF A BULKHEAD COULD POSSIBLY PREVENT PBD
OPEN/CLOSING. FAILURE COULD PREVENT A SECURE LATCH OF HOOK WITH
ROLLER WHEN FORCE CAUSES TORQUE LIMITER TO SLIP. SAFE ENTRY CAN
















REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039 B
z
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FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594180, V070-594280
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF A ROLLER ASSEMBLY WOULD INCREASE THE LOAD ON THE
REMAINING ROLLERS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
w
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-555
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /_
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
V070-594222
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO RUN TILL SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME LIMIT
REACHED. TORQUE LIMITER WOULD BEGIN SLIPPING WHEN DOOR REACHED
CLOSED POSITION. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.









































BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDw/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
V070-594222
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOOR CLOSED SWITCH PRE_TURELY GOING TO THE CLOSED POSITION WOULD
SHUT OFF A MOTOR. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE CLOSING THE PBD
AT A REDUCED RATE. FAILURE OF BOTH SWITCHES WOULD PREVENT
COMPLETE PBD CLOSURE AND LATCHING WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039











BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE
FAILS TO SWITCH












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594222
c [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, MISADJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE WOULD PREVENT A BULKHEAD
LATCH GANG FROM ENGAGING THE BULKHEAD ROLLERS AND CLOSING THE
PBD. THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE A CRT MESSAGE TO ALERT THE CREW.
MANUAL PROCEDURE CAN THEN CLOSE PBD. A SAFE ENTRY IS









































BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE
PREMATURE OPERATION












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
V070-594222
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION, INADVERTENT OPERATION, MISADJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE SWITCHING BY THE READY-TO-LATCH MODULE WOULD CAUSE A
PREMATURE ATTEMPT TO LATCH. COULD POSSIBLY INTERFERE WITH
CLOSING PBD. IF THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE THE LOSS OF A LATCH
GANG REDUCES VEHICLE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY BUT A SAFE ENTRY CAN
BE ACCOMPLISHED.
m
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-559
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MOTOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0004
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS A PBD DRIVE MOTOR CAUSES THE OPEN/CLOSING OF THE PBD AT
A REDUCED RATE BY THE REDUNDANT MOTOR. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD
ONLY HAPPEN IF BOTH MOTORS FAIL WHEN OPENING THE PBD. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON FAILURE OF BOTH MOTORS AND UNABLE TO








































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
FAILS TO ENGAGE












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CLUTCH TO ENGAGE WHEN POWER IS APPLIED WOULD PREVENT
THE MOTOR SHAFT FROM ROTATING. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD COMPLETE
OPEN/CLOSING OF PBD BUT AT A SLOWER RATE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-561
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE CLUTCH TO DISENGAGE WOULD ALLOW THE MOTOR SHAFT TO
ROTATE INSTEAD OF BEING STOPPED. SINCE THIS OCCURS AFTER
OPEN/CLOSING OF PBD THIS HAS MINIMAL IMPACT. THE FAILURE WOULD
BE IMPORTANT IF THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR ALSO WERE TO FAIL. THIS










































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO DISENGAGE WHEN POWER IS APPLIED WOULD PREVENT
THE MOTOR SHAFT FROM ROTATING. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD COMPLETE
OPEN/CLOSING OF THE PBD BUT AT A SLOWER RATE.
REFERENCES: V070-594i25
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-563
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE
FAILS TO ENGAGE










PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO ENGAGE WOULD ALLOW THE MOTOR SHAFT TO ROTATE
INSTEAD OF BEING LOCKED. SINCE THIS OCCURS AFTER OPEN/CLOSING OF
PBD THIS HAS MINIMAL IMPACT. THE FAILURE WOULD BE IMPORTANT IF
THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR ALSO WERE TO FAIL. THIS WOULD CAUSE A






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT:






PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC
SLIPS












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /







SLIPPING OF THE CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC WOULD REDUCE THE INPUT TO THE
DIFFERENTIAL AND THE RATE OF PBD OPEN/CLOSING. REDUNDANT MOTOR
WOULD SUPPLY OPEN/CLOSING POWER. LOSS OF MOTOR ALONG WITH
CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC SLIPPAGE WOULD PERMIT BACKDRIVING BY REMAINING
















ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN/CLOSE PBD. IF UNABLE TO OPEN THE PBD THEN A LOSS
OF MISSION RESULTS. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE THE PBD THEN A SAFE ENTRY
CANNOT BE MADE. AN EVA, THE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY, WOULD BE















































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
PARTIAL OUTPUT












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: /







CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, PARTIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF OUTPUT OF TORQUE FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL WERE LOW ENOUGH THE
SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME LIMIT WOULD BE HIT. THE CREW HAS VISUAL
CUES OF PBD MOVEMENT AND POSITION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION IF
FAILURE OCCURS WHEN OPENING PBD. ON CLOSING OF THE PBD FLIGHT
RULES ALLOW DRIVING BEYOND SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME BECAUSE VISUAL
CUE EXISTS.
REFERENCES: V070-594125, FLIGHT RULES SECTION IO-MMACS

















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING i_-_i












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: I/I
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT PBD OPEN/CLOSING. FAILURE WHEN
OPENING THE PBD CAUSES A LOSS OF MISSION. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE THE
PBD THEN AN UNSAFE CONDITION WOULD EXIST FOR ENTRY. AN EVA
PROCEDURE EXISTS TO CLOSE THE PBD. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE















































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
FAILS TO OPERATE












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEARBOX FAILURE CAUSES NO TORQUE TRANSFER TO THE PBD TORQUE SHAFT
AND ROTARY ACTUATORS. PBD STOPS MOVEMENT, FAILS CLOSED, OPEN OR
IN TRANSIT. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD NOT BE
OPENED FAR ENOUGH. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD OCCUR IF PBD
COULD NOT BE CLOSED. AN EVA PROCEDURE EXISTS FOR MANUAL CLOSURE
OF PBD.
REFERENCES: V070-594125












ITEM: PAYLOADBAY DOORDRIVE GEARBOX
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING ....












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM _ __
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MEC_ISM .......
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING CAUSES THE TORQUE LIMITERS IN EACH PBD ROTARY
ACTUATOR TO SLIP. PBD STOPS MOVEMENT, FAILS CLOSED, OPEN OR IN
TRANSIT. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD NOT BE OPENED
FAR ENOUGH. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD OCCUR IF PBD








































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
PARTIAL OUTPUT












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INSUFFICIENT OUTPUT WOULD NOT FULLY ROTATE THE PBD. SINGLE MOTOR
DRIVE TIME WOULD BE REACHED BEFORE FULL PBD TRAVEL COMPLETED.
VISUAL CUES _ AVAILABLE TO THE CREW TO MONITOR PBDMOVEMENT.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125














PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLING
BROKEN












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
T
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLING COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF UP TO 4 PBD
ROTARY ACTUATORS. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD NOT
BE OPENED. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD HAPPEN IF PBD COULD NOT BE










































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
SEIZED BEARING












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VACUUM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEIZED BEARING WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. EACH DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT
BEARING ASSEMBLY HAS TWO DOUBLE SEALED/DUAL ROTATION BEARINGS.
SINGLE BEARING WOULD CONTINUE TO TRANSMIT TORQUE BETWEEN TORQUE
SHAFT SECTIONS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHCLE FOR A SINGLE FAILURE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-573
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 5160 ABORT: I/I
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, BROKEN SUPPORT HOUSING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM __
3) PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVEMECHANISM







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0008
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SUPPORT HOUSING BREAKING FROM THE ORBITER FUSELAGE ATTACHMENT
WOULD BIND OR BREAK TORQUE SHAFT. PBD MOVEMENT WOULD BE
PREVENTED. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD NOT BE
OPENED FAR ENOUGH. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD
NOT








































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
BROKEN SUPPORT SHAFT












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0008
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN SUPPORT SHAFT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF 1 TO 4 ROTARY
ACTUATORS. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD NOT BE
OPENED. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD HAPPEN IF PBD COULD NOT BE





REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-575
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: 3/iR
MDAC ID: 5162 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
LIMITER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, TORQUE LIMITER SLIPS AT
LESS THAN MINIMUM LIMIT












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TORQUE LIMITER SLIPPING AT LESS THAN THE MINIMUM SPECIFIED LIMIT
WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF THERE IS NO OBSTACLE TO PBD MOVEMENT
THE REMAINING 5 ROTARY ACTUATORS CAN OPEN/CLOSE THE PBD. IF THE
DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY WERE TO JAM THE OTHER TORQUE LIMITERS
WOULD SLIP ALSO_D PBD MOVEMENT WOULD STOP. AN EVA CAPABILITY





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 5163 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
LIMITER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, TORQUE LIMITER FAILS TO
SLIP AT MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE LIMIT












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO PBD AND/OR PBD DRIVE SYSTEM IF TORQUE LIMITER
DOES NOT SLIP AT MAXIMUM TORQUE LIMIT. DAMAGE TO PBD COULD
POSSIBLY CAUSE THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-577
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
TORQUE LIMITER FAILS TO OPERATE











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRI_v'E MEC__ ........
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0005, MC162-0008-0033
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TORQUE LIMITER TO RELEASE TORQUE CAUSED BY A JAM COULD
CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE PBD AND/OR DRIVE SYSTEM. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION IF PBD CANNOT BE OPENED OR LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF CANNOT







































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
JAMMED ROTARY ACTUATOR GEARBOX












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JAMMED ROTARY ACTUATOR GEARBOX WOULD PREVENT DOOR LINKAGE FROM
MOVING. TORQUE LIMITERS WOULD SLIP DUE TO JAMMED LINKAGE. PBD
OPEN/CLOSING STOPS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AND MISSION.




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-579
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY AC_ATOR/TORQUE
ROTARY AC_ATOR OUTPUT ARM BROKEN












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MEC_ISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY AC_ATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA_CH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
8NORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
_DING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SC_ENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0005, MC162-0008-0033
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
BROKEN ROTARY AC_ATOR OUTPUT ARM WOULD T.WT LINKAGE PUSHROD FLOAT
_EE. THE PUSHROD THEN COULD LODGE IN A POSITION WHICH WOULD JAM
LINKAGE AND PREVENT PBD MOVEMENT. POSSIBL_. LOSS OF CREW/VEHIC_






































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
BROKEN MOUNTING BRACKET












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN MOUNTING BRACKET WOULD LESSEN STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF
ASSEMBLY. THE 3 REMAINING MOUNTING AREAS WILL TAKE UP THE LOAD.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. POSSIBLE JAMMING COULD
OCCUR IF TWO OR MORE MOUNTING POINTS FAIL.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-581
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BiNDING/J_ING IN DOOR DRIVE LIEGE CAUSES ALLTORQUE LIMITER
TO SLIP. DOOR MOVEMENT WOULD STOP. LOSS OF MISSION IF UNABLE TO
OPEN PBD. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF UNABLE TO CLOSE PBD. EVA










































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
BROKEN












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT 0RBITER MIDFUSE_GE
PART NUMBER: V070-594126-0001, V070-594130-0001, V070-5943i'0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN PUSHROD OR BELLCRANK WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR
CREW/VEHICLE. REMAINING 5 DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLIES WILL
OPEN/CLOSE PBD.
REFERENCES: V070-594125

















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: " /
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD/AFT ROTARY ACTUATOR ON STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ -_- _..... _._i_ ._- _ ...... _ _
PBD MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO RUN. WITH TWO MOTORS OPERATING THE
DOOR WOULD REACH FULL OPEN POSITION, TORQUE LIMITERS WOULD SLIP
WHEN LINKAGES WILL NO LONGER MOVE. IN THE EVENT OF A FAILED
MOTOR T_ SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME LIMIT WOULD BE HIT AND MOTOR









































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD/AFT ROTARY ACTUATOR ON STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN LIMIT SWITCH PREMATURELY GOING TO THE OPEN POSITION WOULD
SHUT OFF A MOTOR. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE OPENING OF PBD
AT A REDUCED RATE. FAILURE IN BOTH SWITCHES WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS
OF MISSION SINCE PBD COULD NOT BE OPENED. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125














PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD/AFT ROTARY ACTUATOR ON STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MCI62-0008X0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. THIS SWITCH IS A GSE
INDICATOR WHICH IS USED ONLY WHEN THE ORBITER IS ON THE PAD. PBD





































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD/AFT ROTARY ACTUATOR ON STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. THIS SWITCH IS A GSE
INDICATOR WHICH IS USED ONLY WHEN THE ORBITER IS ON THE PAD.




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-587
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR z
WARPED .....
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM







SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH : / RT_ : /
LIFTOFF : / TAL: /
ONORBIT : 1/1 AOA : /
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : 1/1
LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER MIDFUSELAGE, PORT AND STARBOARD SIDES
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
MISRIGGED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WARPED PBD COULD NOT BE LATCHED CLOSED DUE TO MISALIGNMENT
BETWEEN LATCHES AND ROLLERS. WARPAGE DUE TO THERMAL GRADIENT CAN
BE CORRECTED BY VARYING ORBITER ATTITUDE. IF WARPAGE CANNOT BE
REDUCED OR ELIMINATED THEN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE.





















































PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER MIDFUSELAGE, PORT AND STARBOARD SIDES
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DAMAGED PANEL WOULD REDUCE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF DAMAGE AREA IS LARGE OR AREA
WERE TO INCREASE TO AN EXTENT THAT ENTIRE DOOR WOULD FAIL.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-589
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WQRKSHEET
m
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 5176 ABORT: 2/IR




SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERYLEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM




























B [NA ] c[P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
AFT STARBOARD/PORT PBDLOCATION:
PART NUMBER:








JAMMED ROLLER COULD PREVENT AFT BULKHEAD LATCH GANG FROM BEING
ENGAGED. RESULTS IN SOME LOSS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. SAFE































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIGNMENT ROLLER GUIDE
BROKEN












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIGNMENT ROLLER GUIDE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT STARBOARD/PORT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN ROLLER GUIDE WOULD INCREASE STRUCTURAL LOAD ON THE
REMAINING 3 ROLLER GUIDES. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-591
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORICSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT:







FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,BROKEN












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR PASSIVE STOP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, MISADJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION DUE TO BROKEN OR MISADJUSTED
PASSIVE STOP. IF ALL 4 WERE _FAIL, EXCESSIVE TRAVEL BY LEFT










































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR SHEAR/FLOATING HINGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:











PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR SHEAR/FLOATING HINGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [ P ]
STARBOARD/PORT ORBITER MIDFUSELAGE
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
w
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING HINGE WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (13 TOTAL,
5 SHEAR HINGES, 8 FLOATING HINGES). NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-18341











CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3L
AIR1, AIR2, AIR3
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR THAT SHORTS OR WITH RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
WOULD ALLOW EXCESSIVE CURRENT TO REACH OTHER COMPONENTS. HIGHER
CURRENT CAUSES LOSS OF COMPONENT AND LOSS OF FUNCTION. REDUNDANT
ELEMENTS WILL CONTINUE OPERATION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO





































CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
OPEN CIRCUIT

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: AIR1, AIR2, AIR3
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR FAILURE AS AN OPEN CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF CURRENT
TO OTHER COMPONENTS. THIS RESULTS IN A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WHEN
AFFECTED COMPONENTS CANNOT OPERATE. REDUNDANT ELEMENTS WILL
CONTINUE OPERATION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099












ITEM: CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: RESISTANCE HIGHER THAN RATED VALUE



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: AIR1, AIR2, AIR3
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTANCE HIGHER THAN RATED VALUE WOULD REDUCE CURRENT TO THE
RELAY WHICH CLOSES TO PASS AC BUS POWER TO THE ACTUATOR MOTORS.
LOGIC CIRCUIT INPUT WOULD BE LOW SIGNIFYING RELAY NEED NOT BE
CLOSED. REDUNDANT MCA WOULD ALLOW AC POWER TO REACH ACTUATOR
MOTORS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.















































PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DC CONTROL BUS
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3L
S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH TO SWITCH TO THE
DESIRED COMMAND (OPEN-STOP-CLOSE) CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
PBDS CAN BE COMMANDED IN THE DESIRED DIRECTION BY USING THE DEU
ON PANEL RI2. THE "PBD SW BYPASS" ENTRY WILL ALLOW SOFTWARE
CONTROL OF THE SWITCH FUNCTIONS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099


















OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3A2
F37-F42
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .........
FAILED FUSE CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF
DC POWER TO RELAYS WHICH ARE CLOSED TO SUPPLY AC POWER TO
ACTUATOR MOTORS. REDUNDANT E_MENTS WILL COMP_TE AC_ATOR










































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DC CONTROL BUS
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3A2
S13 (SYS 1), S14 (SYS 2)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF PBD MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH TO GO TO THE COMMANDED
POSITION CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. POWER COULD STILL BE
APPLIED TO THE ACTUATOR MOTOR RELAYS AND MCA LOGIC RELAYS BY
USING THE DEU ON PANEL RI2. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099












ITEM: MAIN DC BUS RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE _ _












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
=
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ORBITER MID FUSELAGE, MID MCA-I, -2, -3, -4
PART NUMBER: K78, K66, K37, K39, K54, K42, K22, K20, K29, K41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICALSHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELAY IS USED TO SUPPLY AC BUS POWER To PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE
MOTORS, CENTERLINE AND BULKHEAD LATCH ACTUATOR MOTORS. FAILURE
OF RELAY CAUSES AN OPEN CIRCUIT AND THE LOSS OF A MOTOR. THE
REDUNDANT MOTOR CONTINUES THE PARTICULAR FUNCTION BUT AT A





































MAIN DC BUS RELAY
FAILS TO OPEN












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER MID FUSELAGE, MID MCA-I, -2, -3, -4
K78, K66, K37, K39, K54, K42, K22, K20, K29, K41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF RELAY TO OPEN HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION. AC MOTOR POWER WILL BE REMOVED WHEN SECOND RELAY IN THE
PAIR OPENS OR VIA DEU COMMANDS.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099



























PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DIODE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: A3CRI, A3CR2, A3CR3, A3CR4
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
OPEN CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE CAUSES A LOSS OF INPUT TO_PAY_AD BAY
TALKBACK. PAYLOAD BAY DOORS STATUS IS DISPLAYED ON CRT SO

























































PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DIODE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER:
AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3A2
A3CRI, A3CR2, A3CR3, A3CR4
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE PREVENTS SIGNAL FROM ONE MDM FEEDING BACK INTO THE OTHER.
SHORTED DIODE WOULD ALLOW FEEDBACK INTO MDM. FEEDBACK WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT. TALKBACKANDVISUAL CUES WOULD SHOW PBD POSITION. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-603
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
SHORTS, RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID _SELAGE MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES -I, -2, -3, -
4
PART NUMBER: SEE PAGES 56AB, AC, AD, AH, _ IN REFERENCE
CAUSES: _ERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR THAT SHORTS OR WITH RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
WOULD ALLOW EXCESSIVE CURRENT TO REACH RELAY AC MOTOR POWER LOGIC
GATE. HIGHTER CURRENT CAUSES LOSS OF COMPONENET. POSSIBLE
PREMATURE AC MOTOR POWER SHUT OFF. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD






































SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
OPEN CIRCUIT












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /




MID FUSELAGE MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES -i, -2, -3, -
SEE PAGES 56AB, AC, AD, AH, AJ IN REFERENCE
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESITOR FAILURE AS AN OPEN CIRCUIT CAUSES MOTOR TO CONTINUE TO
RUN. RELAY WOULD NOT GET INPUT SIGNIFYING DOOR OR LATCHES WERE
IN DESIRED POSITION. MOTOR WOULD STALL WHEN LIMIT REACHED. CREW
CAN REMOVE AC MOTOR POWER. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-605
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTANCE HIGHER T_ RATED VALUE












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBiT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /




MID FUSELAGE MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES -i, -2, -3, -
SEE PAGES 56AB, AC, AD, AH, AJ IN REFERENCE
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTANCE HIGHER THAN RATED VALUE WOULD REDUCE CURRENT TO THE
RELAY CONTROLLING AC POWER TO THE ACTUATOR MOTOR. LOGIC CIRCUIT
INPUT WOULD BE LOW SIGNIFYING DOOR OR LATCHES _RE IN THE DESIRED
POSITION. RELAY WOULD OPEN AND AC POWER WOULD BE REMOVED
FROM ACTUATOR MOTOR. REDUNDANT ELEMENTS WOULD CONTINUE FUNCTION












































PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
FAILS TO CLOSE












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY

















MID FUSELAGE MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES -I, -2, -3, -
SEE PAGES 56AB, AC, AD, AH, AJ IN REFERENCE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELAY IS USED TO CONNECT THE 3 PHASE AC POWER TO THE ACTUATOR
MOTORS FOR OPENING/CLOSING PAYLOAD BAY DOORS OR OPERATING THE
LATCHES. FAILURE OF RELAY CAUSES AN OPEN CIRCUIT AND THE LOSS OF
A MOTOR. THE REDUNDANT MOTOR CONTINUES THE PARTICULAR FUNCTION
BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
m































PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /




MID FUSELAGE MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES -i, -2, -3, -
SEE PAGES 56AB, AC, AD, AH, AJ IN REFERENCE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAII//RE OF RELAY TO OPEN CAUSES THE LOSS OF AN ACTUATOR MOTOR.
RELAY IS USED TO CHANNEL THE THREE PHASE AC BUS POWER TO THE
ACTUATOR MOTOR (A-B-C OR A-C-B). IF RELAY USED IN RELEASING
LATCHES AND OPENING PBD FAILS TO OPEN THEN WHEN PBD CLOSURE IS
BEGUN THE B ANDC PHASE REVERSAL WILL NOT OCCUR. REDUNDANT MOTOR
WILL COMPLETE FUNCTION. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099










































MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
AC 3 PHASE BUS
MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /




CBI2, CB7, CB9, CBI3, CB2, CB3
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, INADVERTENT OPERATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CIRCUIT BREAKER CAUSES LOSS OF THE THREE PHASE AC
POWER FROM THE MAIN AC BUS. REDUNDANT MOTOR WILL COMPLETE
FUNCTION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-II174












ITEM: MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CONTROL BUS
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL MA73C
PART NUMBER: S12, $7, $9, S13, $2, $3
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILING OFF CAUSES AN OPEN CIRCUIT AND THE LOSS OF CONTROL
SIGNAL TO THE ASSOCIATED RPC. REDUNDANT RPC FOR FUNCTION WOULD
ALLOW OPERATION TO BE COMPLETED BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT









































MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
FAILS ON












PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CONTROL BUS
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /




S12, $7, $9, S13, $2, $3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CONTROL BUS
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
SECOND RPC PERMITS CONTINUED PBD OPERATION WITH REDUNDANT MOTORS.























PAYLOAD BAY RADIATORS ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
u
C-613
IPAYLOAD BAY RADIATORS ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C





6106 3/IR /NA P P P
6107 3/IR /NA P P P
6108 3/IR /NA P P P
6109 3/3 /NA
6110 3/3 /NA
6111 3/IR /NA P P P
6112 3/3 /NA
6113 3/3 /NA





6206 3/1R /NA P P P
6207 3/IR /NA P P P
6208 3/IR /NA P P P
6209 3/3 /NA
6210 3/3 /NA
6211 3/IR /NA P P P
6212 3/3 /NA
6213 3/3 /NA
6301 3/IR /NA P P P
6302 3/IR /NA P P P
6501 3/3 /NA
6502 3/3 /NA















LIMIT SW, RELEASE (SI), ($3), ($4)
LIMIT SW, LATCH ($2), ($3), ($4)











LIMIT SW, DEPLOY (SI,$2,$4)
LIMIT SW, STOW (SI,$2,$3)
DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHAFT
DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACTUATOR
DEPLOYMENT CRANK AND LINK
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/S6)
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/S6)
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/S7)
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/$7)
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LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO START












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
MOTOR
CRITICALITIES















Mc287-oo37-OOOl (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE MOTOR/POWER SOURCE IN A PDU RESULTS IN TWICE THE
NORMAL DRIVE TIME TO RELEASE/LATCH ONE SIX-LATCH GANG FOR THE
AFFECTED RADIATOR PANEL. FAILURE OF SECOND MOTOR IS LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO RELEASE/LATCH THAT PANEL. IF UNABLE TO RELEASE,
TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY IS REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME
MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATION DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES
REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR
INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL DURING
DEORBIT/ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG NO 14.1
















PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH, FAILS












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0037-0001 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT,_PIECE'PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/_TI_LE: ........
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT FOR AFFECTED MOTOR CAUSING
















REFERENCES: V070_5§44S0, SSSH DWG NO 14 1
B





















PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH, FAILS












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES













LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0037-0001 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BRAKES ARE DESIGNED TO PREVENT MOTORS FROM TURNING WHEN THE
MECHANSIM IS UNPOWERED AND TO PREVENT A FAILED MOTOR FROM BEING
DRIVEN VIA THE DIFFERENTIAL WHILE THE OTHER MOTOR IS TURNING.
FAILURE OF A MOTOR BRAKE TO ENGAGE IS NOT DETECTABLE AND HAS NO
APPARENT EFFECT UNLESS THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR FAILS. IN THIS
EVENT, BACKDRIVE FROM MOTOR #2 VIA THE DIFFERENTIAL IS PROBABLE,
BUT THE NEAR TERM EFFECTS ARE RELATIVELY INCONSEQUENTIAL.
w REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-617
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




7/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3




FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE - HIGH, FAILS TO SLIP
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
3) RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM






SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0037-0001 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A TORQUE LIMITER CLUTCH TO SLIP IN RESPONSE TO THE PDU
OUTPUT REACHING/EXCEEDING A SET LIMIT COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OR MECHANICAL DAMAGE AND/OR STALLING AND OVERHEATING OF THE
DRIVING MOTOR. LOSS OF ONE MOTOR RESULTS IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE
















REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG NO 14.1 I
iw
im






















FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE - LOW, FAILS TO ENGAGE












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES













LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0037-0001 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE THE RIGHT CLUTCH PLATE/SPRING WASHER/FRICTION RINGS
FAIL IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO ALLOW THE DRIVE GEAR TO ROTATE FREE
OF THE OUTPUT SHAFT. HENCE, THE ROTARY INPUT OF ONE DRIVE MOTOR
IS LOST AND THE RELEASE/LATCH STATE WILL BE EFFECTED IN
SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME.
u
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-619
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,














LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TION_A_:
WORSE CASE FAILURE OF THE DIFFERENTIALASSEMBLY fS COMPLETE LOSS
OF THE OUTPUT OF A PDU AND RESULTANT INABILITY TO RELEASE/LATCH
THE ASSOCIATED RADIATOR PANEL. IF UNABLE TO RELEASE, TOTAL
COOLING CAPACITY IS REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD
OPERATIONS DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES REQUIREMENTS. IF
UNABLE TO LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD
CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL DURING DEORBIT/ENTRY,






































PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE TORQUE LIMITERS WILL RELEASE AT THE PRESENT LIMIT TO
ALLOW BOTH DRIVING MOTORS TO RUN FREE OF THE OUTPUT SHAFT. THIS
WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF OUTPUT OF A PDU AND INABILITY TO
RELEASE OR LATCH THE ASSOCIATED RADIATOR PANEL. IF UNABLE TO
RELEASE, TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY IS REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME
MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES
REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR
INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL DURING
DEORBIT/ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG NO 14.1















STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF OUTPUT, STRIPPED TEETH












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE GEARBOX FAILS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO TRANSMIT
REDUCED OR NO ROTARY MOTION TO PDU OUTPUT SHAFT. WORSE CASE
EFFECT IS COMPLETE LOSS OF PDU OUTPUT RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
RELEASE OR LATCH THE AFFECTED RADIATOR PANEL. IF UNABLE TO
RELEASE, TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY IS REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME
MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES
REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR
INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL DURING
DEORBIT/ENTRY.































LIMIT SWITCHES, RELEASE (SI), (S3), ($4)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
LIMIT SWITCHES, RELEASE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A REDUNDANT PAIR OF RELEASE LIMIT SWITCHES WITHIN A
PDU WILL ALLOW THE MECHANISM TO CONTINUE TO DRIVE TOW_DS THE
RELEASE STATE UNTIL (I) THE RELEASE COMMAND SIGNAL IS REMOVED,
(2) TORQUE LIMITER SETTINGS ARE REACHED, OR (3) STRUCTURAL
FAILURE IS EXPERIENCED SOME POINT IN THE DRIVE TRAIN DOWNSTREAM
OF THE TORQUE LIMITERS. PORT (STARBOARD) INDICATOR, DS4(DS2) ON
PANEL RI3L WILL SHOW BARBERPOLE ALTHOUGH LATCHES FOR THE AFFECTED
PANEL ARE IN THE RELEASE STATE.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409, VS70-960099, SSSH DWG. N. 15.6
i












ITEM: LIMIT SWITCHES, LATCH ($2), ($3), ($4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
LIMIT SWITCHES, LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A REDUNDANT PAIR OF LATCH LIMIT SWITCHES WITHIN A PDU
WILL ALLOW THE MEC_ISM TO CONTINUE TO DRIVE TOWARDS THE LATCH
STATE UNTIL (1) THE LATCH COMMAND SIGNAL IS REMOVED, (2) TORQUE
LIMITER SETTINGS ARE REACHED, OR (3) STRUCTURAL FAILURE IS
EXPERIE-NCED AT soME P_INT=_N THE DRI_TRAiN _WNSTRE_ OF THE _
TORQUE LIMITERS. PORT (STARBORD) INDICATOR, DS4(DS2) ON PANEL
RI3L WILL SHOW BARBERPOLE ALTHOUGH LATCHES FOR THE AFFECTED PANEL
ARE IN THE LATCH STATE.










































LATCH TORQUE SHAFT ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDIND/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH TORQUE SHAFT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-
PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH A BROKEN/DISCONNECTED TORQUE SHAFT, AT LEAST ONE PAIR OF
LATCHES WILL DRIVE TO THE RELEASE/LATCH STATE. WITH A
BINDING/JAMMED SHAFT SEGMENT, TORQUE LIMITERS WILL ACTIVATE AT
PRESET LIMIT TO PREVENT MOTOR BURN OUT AND CAPABILITY TO
RELEASE/LATCH THE EFFECTED RADIATOR PANEL IS LOST. IF UNABLE TO
LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR
LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL DURING DEORBIT/ENTRY.
n
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG. NO. 14.1












ITEM: LATCH ROTARY ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE), LOSS OF OUTPUT,
STRIPPED TEETH/GEARS, BROKEN OUTPUT ARM
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE PDU OUTPUT IS INTACT AND IS TRANSMITTED TO THE
ROTARY ACTUATOR (IN TERMS OF EFFECT, A BINDING/JAMMED ACTUATOR IS
TREATED AS A FAILED LATCH TORQUE SHAI_T ASSEMBLY)_ DUE TO
INTERNAL SLIPPAGE OR A BRO_ OUTPUT ARM, MOTION IS NOT OUTPUT TO
THE LATCH HOOK MECHANISM RESULTING IN THE INABILITY TO
RELEASE/LATCH THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF LATCHES. REMAINING LATCH
PAIR(S) WILL DRIVE TO THE COMMANDED STATE; INDICATORS ON PANEL
RI3L SHOULD SHOW BARBERPOLE ALTHOUGH REMAINING LATCHES WILL BE IN
THE COMMANDED STATE.
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG. NO. 14.1






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6113 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: LATCH HOOK MECHANISM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO RELEASE/LATCH, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: V070-594460-001, VS070-594470-001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MOST PLAUSIBLE EFFECT OF A FAILED LATCH HOOK MECHANISM
COMPONENT (BELLCRANK, BELLCRANK ATTACHMENT, PUSH-PULL ROD,
ADJUSTABLE STOP, LINK, LATCH ROLLER) IS THE LOSS OF THE ABILITY
TO RELEASE/LATCH A SINGLE LATCH. WORST CASE FAILURE IS THE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO RELEASE/LATCH A LATCH PAIR. EITHER CASE IS
CONSIDERED A CRITICALITY THREE (3) AS IT WILL NOT AFFECT MISSION
CONTINUANCE.
z
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG. NO. 14.1
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LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO START
- _-_ _ ,_ -- ;_E_ i_+ r • -_ _ :_











MEC ICAL AC ATION SYSTm 
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE WIT
MOTOR
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY _ORS _
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0002 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE MOTOR/POWER SOURCE IN A PDU RESULTS IN TWICE THE
NORMAL DRIVE TIME TO DEPLOY STOW THE TWO RADIATOR PANELS (PORT OR
STARBOARD) DRIVEN BY THAT PDU. FAILURE OF SECOND MOTOR IS LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY/STOW TH_ AFFECTED PAIR OF PANELS.
IF UNAB_TO DEPLOY, TOTAL COOLING CAPABITY IS REDUCED WHICH MAY
AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS DEPENDENT UPON WATER
CONSUMABLES REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO STOW, PLBD CLOSURE IS



















REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1
mm


















PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH, FAILS












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
























MC-287-0037-0002 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT FOR AFFECTED MOTOR CAUSING
TWICE THE NORMAL DRIVE TIMETO DEPLOY/STOW.
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1





DATE: 7/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3





PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM












SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES












REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0002 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BRAKES ARE DESIGNED TO PREVENT MOTORS FROM TURNING WHEN THE
MECHANISM IS UNPOWERED AND TO PREVENT A FAILED MOTOR FROM BEING
DRIVEN VIA THE DIFFERENTIAL WHILE THE OTHER MOTOR IS TURNING.
FAILURE OF A MOTOR BRAKE IS NOT DETECTABLE AND HAS NO
APPARENT EFFECT UNLESS THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR FAILS. IN THIS
EVENT, BACKDRIVE FROM MOTOR #2 IS PROBABLEF BUT THE NEAR-TERM
EFFECTS ARE RELATIVELY INCONSEQUENTIAL.




































FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE-HIGH, FAILS TO SLIP












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES















MC-287-0037-0002 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A TORQUE LIMITER CLUTCH TO SLIP IN RESPONSE TO THE PDU
OUTPUT REACHING/EXCEEDING A SET LIMIT COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OR MECHANICAL DAMAGE AND/OR STALLING AND OVERHEATING OF THE
DRIVING MOTOR. LOSS OF ONE MOTOR RESULTS IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE
TIME TO DEPLOY/STOW THE AFFECTED RADIATOR PANELS (PORT OR
STARBOARD).
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-631
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE-LOW, FAILS TO ENGAGE












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0002 (TWO MOTORS PER PDV)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: .............
IN THIS MODE THE RIGHT CLUTCH PLATE/SPRING WASHER/PR_iON_NGS
FAIL IN SUCH A MANNER AST0 ALLOW THE=DRIVE GEA_RTOROTATE FREE
OF THE OUTPUT SHA_. HENCE, THE ROTARY OUTPUT OF ONE DRIVE MOTOR
IS LOST AND THE COMMANDED DEPLOY/STATE WILL BE EFFECTED










































PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORSE CASE FAILURE OF THE DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY IS COMPLETE LOSS
OF THE OUTPUT OF THE PDU AND THE RESULTANT INABILITY TO
DEPLOY/STOW THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF RADIATOR PANELS (PORT OR
STARBOARD). IF UNABLE TO DEPLOY, TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY IS
REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS
DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO
STOW, PLBD CLOSURE IS UNLIKELY AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW MAY
RESULT.
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1













FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
FROZEN GEARS












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MEC_I_MS _
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE TORQUE LIMITERS WILL RELEASE AT THE PRESENT LIMIT TO
ALLOW BOTH DRIVING MOTORS TO RUN FREE OF THE OUTPUT SHAFT. THIS
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT OF THE PDU AND INABILITY TO
DEPLOY/STOW THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF RADIATOR PANELS (PORT OR
STARBOARD). IF UNABLE TO DEPLOY, TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY IS
REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS
DEPENDENT UPON wATER CONSUMMABLES REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO
STOW, PLBD CLOSURE IS UNLIKELY AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW MAY
RESULT.

































STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF OUTPUT, STRIPPED TEETH












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:_ /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE THE GEARBOX FAILS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO TRANSMIT
REDUCED OR NO ROTARY MOTION TO THE PDU OUTPUT SHAFT. WORSE CASE
EFFECT IS COMPLETE LOSS OF OUTPUT OF THE PDU RESULTING IN
INABILITY TO DEPLOY/STOW THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF RADIATOR PANELS
(PORT OR STARBOARD). IF UNABLE TO DEPLOY, TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY
IS REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS. IF
UNABLE TO STOW, PLBD CLOSURE IS UNLIKELY AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW MAY RESULT.
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-635
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LIMIT SWITCHES, DEPLOY (Sl, $2, $4)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION sYSTEM
2) PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
3) RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A REDUNDANT PAIR OF DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES WITHIN THE
PDU WILL ALLOW THE _C_ISM TO CONTINUE TO DRIVE TOWARDS THE
DEPLOY STATE UNTIL 1) THE DEPLOY COMMAND SIGNAL IS REMOVED, 2)
TORQUE LIMITER SETTINGS ARE REACHED, OR 3) STRUCTURAL FAILURE IS
EXPERIENCED AT SOME POINT IN THE DRIVE TRAIN DOWNSTREAM OF THE _
TORQUE LIMITERS. PORT (STARBOARD) INDICATOR, DS5 (DS3) ON PANEL
R13L WILL SHOW BARBERPOLE ALTHOUGH THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF
RADIATOR PANELS IS IN THE DEPLOY STATE.





































LIMIT SWITCHES, STOW (SI, $2, $3)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
LIMIT SWITCHES, DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A REDUNDANT PAIR OF STOW LIMIT SWITCHES WITHIN THE PDU
WILL ALLOW THE MECHANISM TO CONTINUE TO DRIVE TOWARDS THE STOW
STATE UNTIL I) THE STOW COMMAND SIGNAL IS REMOVED, 2) TORQUE
LIMITER SETTINGS ARE REACHED, OR 3) STRUCTURAL FAILURE IS
EXPERIENCED AT SOME POINT THE DRIVE TRAIN DOWNSTREAM OF THE
TORQUE LIMITERS. PORT (STARBOARD) INDICATOR, DS5 (DS3) ON PANEL
RI3L WILL SHOW BARBERPOLE ALTHOUGH THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF
RADIATOR PANELS IS IN THE STOW STATE.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; VS70-960099; SSSH DWG. NO 15.6
=
w



















PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
3) RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA






CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH A BROKEN/DISCONNECTED TORQUE SHAFT, OUTPUT OF THE PDU IS
LOST TO ONE OR BOTH OF THE ROTARY ACTUATORS DEPENDENT UPON THE
LOCATION OF THE BREAK. IF BOTH ACTUATORS AFFECTED, CAPABILITY TO
DEPLOY/STOW THAT RADIATOR PANEL IS LOST. WITH A BINDING/
JAMMED SHAFT SEGMENT, TORQUE LIMITERS WILL ACTIVATE AT THE PRESET
LIMIT TO PREVENT MOTOR BURNOUT AND CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY/STOW THE
AFFECTED PAIR OF RADIATOR PANELS (PORT, STARBOARD) IS LOST. IF
UNABLE TO STO, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD
CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANELS DURING DEORBIT/ENTRY.
































ITEM: DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE), LOSS OF OUTPUT,
STRIPPED TEETH/GEARS, BROKEN OUTPUT ARM
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE PDU OUTPUT IS INTACT AND IS TRANSMITTED TO THE
ROTARY ACTUATOR (IN TERMS OF EFFECTS, A BINDING/JAMMED ACTUATOR
IS TREATED AS A FAILED DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHAFT ASSEMBLY). DUE
TO INTERNAL SLIPPAGE OR A BROKEN OUTPUT ARM, MOTION IS NOT OUTPUT
TO THE ASSOCIATED DEPLOYMENT CRANK. THE REMAINING ACTUATOR
SHOULD OPERATE NORMALLY TO DRIVE THE RADIATOR PANEL TO THE DEPLOY
STATE. THE INDICATOR ON PANEL RI3L WILL SHOW DEPLOY FOR THAT
RADIATOR PAIR (PORT OR STARBOARD) ALTHOUGH ONE END OF ONE PANEL
MAY NOT BE FULLY DEPLOYED.
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO. 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-639
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS_WORKS_EET
DATE : 7/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6213 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: DEPLOYMENT CRANK AND LINK ......... _
FAILURE MODE : FAILS TO DEPLOY/STOW, PHYSICAL r BINDING/JAMMING,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST : W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PLB RADIATOR DEP_Y _CHAN-iSMS
3) RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC _
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB--I T: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO : _ "_/NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]




WORST CASE FAILURE OF A BROKEN/DISCONNECTED DEPLOYMENT CRANK OR
LINK IS LOSS OF DEPLOYMENT MOTION/FORCE FOR ONE END OF ONE
RADIATOR PANEL. THE REMAINING ROTARY ACTUATOR/DEPLOYMENT CRANK
MECHANISM SHOULD DRIVE THE RADIATOR PANEL TO THE DEPLOY STATE.
THE INDICATOR ON PANEL RI3L WILL SHOW DEPLOY FOR THAT RADIATOR




















V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO. 14.1
I
ms







ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS/RADIATOR PANELS
TBD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
DISTORTION/ELONGATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISTORTION/WARP OF PLBD, RADIATOR PANELS, LONGERON SIL MAY OCCUR
IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO CAUSE HINGES TO BIND OR JAM. WORSE CASE
EFFECT OF A BINDING/JAMMED RADIATOR HINGE IS LOSS A THE
CAPABILITY TO STOW A DEPLOYED RADIATOR PANEL. IF UNABLE TO STOW
POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE
RADIATOR PANEL DURING DEORBIT/ENTRY.
REFERENCES: TBD
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-641
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT \















HINGE FITTINGS/POiNT _ ....... -
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRAC_












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR HINGES
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS/RADIATOR PANELS
TBD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
DISTORTION/ELONGATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
EFFECTS OF FRACTURED HINGE PARTS, SHEARED/MISSING HINGE PINS ARE
NIL IF THE FAILURE IS ISOLATED TO A SINGLE HINGE/HINGE POINT.
WORSE CASE EFFECT WOULD BE THE FAILURE OF TWO ADJACENT
HINGES/HINGE POINTS WITH THE RADIATORS IN THE DEPLOY STATE












































LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
FAILS TO RELEASE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: ($4/$6)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH SELECTION OF RELEASE POSITION ON SWITCHES $4 AND $6, EFFECT
OF A SINGLE FAILURE IS TO PRECLUDE CONTROL POWER FROM BEING
PASSED TO THE MMCA'S (TWO ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SWITCH) CAUSING
LOSS OF SINGLE (REDUNDANT) MOTOR IN EACH LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
WITH RELEASE FUNCTION OCCURING IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME (TWICE
NORMAL). SECOND FAILURE IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RELEASE
RADIATORS WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS
DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES REQUIREMENTS. PARTIAL SWTICH
FAILURE (CONTACT OPEN) RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF USE OF A RADIATOR
PAIR (PORT OR STARBOARD) AND SHOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION
CONTINUANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-643
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMh_T















LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
FAILS IN RELEASE, FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH DESELECTION OF RELEASE POSITION ON SWITCHES $4 AND S6,
EFFECT OF A SHORT ACROSS A CONTACT PAIR IS TO ALLOW CONTINUOUS
POWER TO BE APPLIED TO THE CONTROL UNIT OF A SINGLE, GATED RELAY
DRIVER/RELAY. THE INVERTED "AND" SIGNAL AT THAT GATE WILL
OPERATE AS NORMAL TO REMOVE THE POWER FROM THE RELAY DRIVER/RELAY
WHEN THE PDU LIMIT SWITCH REACHES THE RELEASED STATE. RELEASE
COMMAND SIGNAL SHOULD BE REMOVED WHEN PLB MECH PWR SYSI/SYS2
SWITCH (SI/$2) PLACED TO OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6




































LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
FAILS TO LATCH, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH SELECTION OF LATCH POSITION ON SWITCHES $4 AND $6, EFFECT OF
A SINGLE FAILURE IS TO PRECLUDE CONTROL POWER FROM BEING PASSED
TO THE MMCA'S (TWO ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SWITCH) CAUSING LOSS OF
SINGLE (REDUNDANT) MOTOR IN EACH LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
WITH LATCH FUNCTION OCCURING IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME (TWICE
NORMAL). SECOND FAILURE IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO LATCH
RADIATORS. IF UNABLE TO LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR INTERFERENCE
WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL(S) DURING
DEORBIT/ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6

















LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
FAILS IN LATCH, FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: RI3L
PART NUMBER: ($4/$6)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH DESELECTION OF LATCH POSITION ON SWITCHES $4 AND $6, EFFECT
OF A SHORT ACROSS A CONTACT PAIR IS TO ALLOW CONTINUOUS POWER TO
BE APPLIED TO THE CONTROL INPUT OF A SINGLE, GATED RELAY
DRIVER/RELAY. THE INVERTED "AND" SINGNAL AT THAT GATE
OPERATE AS NORMAL TO REMOVE THE POWER FROM THE RELAY DRIVER RELAY
WHEN THE PDU LIMIT SWITCH REACHES THE LATCH STATE. LATCH COMMAND
SIGNAL SHOULD BE REMOVED WHEN PLB MECH PWR SYSI/SYS2 SWITCH

















REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6
I
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RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
FAILS TO DEPLOY, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: PIECE-PARTFAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
WITH SELECTION OF DEPLOY POSITON ON SWITCHES $5 AND $7, EFFECT OF
A SINGLE FAILURE IS TO PRECLUDE CONTROL POWER FROM BEING PASSED
TO THE MMCA'S (TWO ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SWITCH) CAUSING LOSS OF
SINGLE (REDUNDANT) MOTOR IN EACH DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
WITH DEPLOY FUNCTION OCCURING IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME (TWICE
NORMAL). SECOND FAILURE IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY
RADIATORS WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS
DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES REQUIREMENTS.
PARTIAL SWITCH FAILURE (CONTACT OPEN) RESULTS IN LOSS OF USE OF A
RADIATOR PAIR (PORT OR STARBARD) AND SHOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION
CONTINUANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG' NO. 15.6
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-647
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
FAILS IN DEPLOY, FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED
















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: ($5/$7)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH DESELECTION OF DEPLOY POSITION ON SWITCHES $5 AND $7, EFFECT
OF A SHORT ACROSS A CONTACT PAIR IS TO ALLOW CONTINUOUS POWER TO
BE APPLIED TO THE CONTROL INPUT OF A SINGLE, GATED RELAY
DRIVER/RELAY. THE INVERTED "AND" SIGNAL AT THAT GATE WILL
OPERATE AS NORMAL TO REMOVE THE POWER FROM THE RELAY DRIVER/RELAY
WHEN THE PDU LIMIT SWITCH REACHES THE DEPLOYED STATE. DEPLOY
COMMAND SIGNAL SHOULD BE REMOVED WHEN PLB MECH PWR SYSI/SYS2



















REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6
u
J






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6509 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO STOW, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH








i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: ($5/$7)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH SELECTION OF STOW POSITION ON SWITCHES $5 AND $7, EFFECT OF
A SINGLE FAILURE IS TO PRECLUDE CONTROL POWER FROM BEING PASSED
TO THE MMCArS (TWO ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SWITCH) CAUSING LOSS OF
SINGLE (REDUNDANT) MOTOR IN EACH DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE
UNIT WITH STOW FUNCTION OCCUR!NG IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME
(TWICE NORMAL). SECOND FAILURE IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO STOW
RADIATORS REQUIRING CREW EVA TO MECHANICALLY DISCONNECT AND STOW
RADIATOR PANELS. DEPLOYED RADIATORS INTERFERE WITH PLBD
CLOSURE WHICH MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6
L














RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
FAILS IN STOW, FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED












PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANIS_




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /_
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA _
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: ($5/$7)
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, DEBIRS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH DESELECTION OF STOW POSITION ON SWITCHES S5 AND S7, EFFECT
OF A SHORT ACROSS A CONTACT PAIR IS TO ALLOW CONTINUOUS POWER TO
BE APPLIED TO THE CONTROL INPUT OF A SINGLE, GATED RELAY
DRIVER/RELAY. THE INVERTED "AND" SIGNAL AT THAT GATE
WILL OPERATE AS NORMAL TO REMOVE THE POWER FROM THE RELAY
DRIVER/RELAY WHEN THE PDU LIMIT SWITCH REACHES THE STOWED STATE.
STOW COMMAND SIGNAL SHOULD BE REMOVED WHEN PLB MECH PWR SYSI/SYS2
SWITCH (SI/$2) PLACED TO OFF.




















PERSO_EL _TCH _ALYSIS WORKSHEETS
u
C-651
IPERSONNEL HATCH ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
u_Dmi_m
7100 * 3/IR /NA P F P PRESSURE PORT
7101 * I/i /NA PRESSURE PORT
7102 * 3/IR /NA P F P 0 RING
7103 * 3/IR /NA P F P O RING
7104 * 3/IR /NA P F P VIEWPORT
7105 3/IR /NA P P P VIEWPORT
7106 * 3/IR /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7107 * 3/IR /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7108 * 3/iR /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7109 * 3/2R /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7110 * 3/2R /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7111 * 3/2R /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7112 * 3/IR /NA P F P O RING
7113 * 3/IR /NA P F P 0 RING
7114 * 3/IR /NA P F P VIEWPORT
7115 3/iR /NA P P P VIEWPORT
7116 3/3 /NA VIEWPORT LATCH
7117 3/3 /NA VIEWPORT LATCH
7118 3/3 3/3 BOOT
7119 3/3 3/3 DRAIN TUBING

















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: DEBRIS IN PORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AIRLOCK PRESSURE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO EQUALIZE WITH PAYLOAD BAY
AND/OR MIDDECK. THIS COULD CAUSE THE AIRLOCK HATCH B TO NOT OPEN
BECAUSE OF HIGHER PRESSURE INSIDE.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-653
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF:. / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MA.AL.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE THROUGH THE 0 RING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A CRACKED O RING COULD CAUSE LEAKAGE OF ATMOSPHERE THROUGH THE O


































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE THROUGH THE VIEWPORT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:





FAILURE MODE : CRACKED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MA.AL.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A BROKEN ACTUATOR WOULD PREVENT OPENING OF THE AIRLOCK. THIS
COULD PREVENT AN EVA TO CLOSE THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS, ETC.
REFERENCES:













FAIL_ MODE: BROWN SHAFT
T._AD _ALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









SUBSYS _AD: H.J. _RY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
_DUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
_CATION: MIDDECK
P_T _BER: _.AL.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
A BROWN ACTUATOR WOULD PRE_NT OPENING OF THE AIR_CK.




















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: DEBRIS IN ACTUATOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A JAMMED ACTUATOR WOULD PREVENT OPENING OF THE AIRLOCK.




REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-661
BINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: DEBIR IN ACTUATOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A CRACKED 0 RING COULD CAUSE LEAKAGE OF ATMOSPHERE THROUGH THE 0
RING. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:














LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2 ) PERSONNEL HATCHES








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS :
LIFTOFF : / TAL:
ONORBIT : 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT : / ATO :
LANDING/SAFING: /









A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






















































DEORBIT: / . ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /






C [ P ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MA.SH.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LATCH THE VIEWPORT COVER CLOSED.
REFERENCES:































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MA.SH.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. THIS FAILURE DOES NOT AFFECT HATCH OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
u














LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















































LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: DEBRIS IN DRAIN TUBING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. THIS FAILURE DOES NOT AFFECT HATCH OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
























































VENT DOOR MECHANISM ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
3/3 3/3
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P










ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID
ACTUATOR MOTOR
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA PURGE SIGNAL DRIVER
MCA DC POWER BUS




























FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE INOPERABLE,
DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARI_SURFACE














SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR ° TAL" 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3






CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS













REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD) m
W


















FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE INOPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING" 3/3





CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO' 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-677
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE INOPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/iR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: NEAR DOOR
PART NUMBER: NASI004-16/18/22, V070-384318-002,5328-002,595528,
V070-385311/2-001/2, (TBD)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.














































INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE













INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3






CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-679
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S_FT - HOUSING
FAIL_ TO ST_T/STOP AS CORDED _D ROTATES
T._.AD _ALYST: H.J. _RY SUBSYS _D: H.J. _RY
B_AK_ HIE_CHY:










INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S_FT - HOUSING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/iR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3






CAUSES: CONT_INATION, _C_ICAL SHOCK, MIS_DLING/ABUSE,
O_R_AD, PIECE-P_T FAIL_, STRUC_L FAILURE, TEMPE__,
THE_L SHOCK, ACCE_TION, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
_SS OF PRESS_E CONTROL DURING T_SIENT P_SSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
REFE_NCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.







































PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3






CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
JAMMED, FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
m
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)















FAILS TO REMAIN IN POSITION, FREELY ROTATES















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3






CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS















REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)





























MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE













MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION,INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROLDURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-683
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 8108 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PREMATURE
OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)













MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION,INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS














REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.























ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 8100 - 8108
FAILURE MODE: ALL FAILURE MODES














SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 8100 - 8108
CAUSES: ALL CAUSES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 8100 -8108 WILL HAVE NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, VEHICLE OR CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
r
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-685
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OPERATION, DELAYED OPERATION, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, FAILS TO START/STOP
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
INSIDE ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY, NEAR VENT DOOR
I0V59A (XX)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, PARTIAL INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY OF ACTUATOR MOTOR TO MOVE VENT DOOR TO REQUIRED
POSITION. EXCESS DELTA P COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND
PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS
GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL.
COULD CREATE A TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO
CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR
ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B



































ITEM: ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO
SWITCH, SHORTED
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
I2%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION" •
PART NUMBER:
INSIDE ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY, NEAR VENT DOOR
TBD
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, PARTIAL INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P
COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH
DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS
DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE
TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-687
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 8503 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY
FAILURE MODE: PARTIAL OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT,
FAILSTOSW_TCH, SHORT_ ........















SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, PARTIAL
INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P MAY
CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH
DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS
DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE
TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.

































ITEM: MCA PURGE SIGNAL DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF
OUTPUT, SHORTED

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: REFERENCE DESIGNATOR - AR(XX)-TYPE 1
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, PARTIAL INPUT, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, LOSS OF
INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GASES (H2) DURING
PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-689
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MCA DC POWER BUS
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: REFERENCE DESIGNATOR - DC-A, B, C
C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSU_ CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRES_ C_ITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P
COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH
DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS
DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE














































MCA AC POWER BUS
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED































REFERENCE DESIGNATOR - AC-I, AC-2, AC-3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, PARTIAL
INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P
COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH
DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS
DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE
TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B



















LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3 _
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: REFERENCE DESIGNATOR - AICR(XX)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOOR DUE TO LOSS OF "CLOSE" COMMAND
SIGNAL TO ACTUATOR MOTOR RELAY LOGIC GATE. LOSS OF
PRESSURE/ACOUSTICS CONTROL DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS.
EXCE_ DELTA P COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUC_RAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE.
POTENTIAL FOR ACOUSTIC DAMAGE TO PAYLOADS. POTENTIAL FOR
ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-
ENTRY .................





































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY




A SHORTED DIODE COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO MDM "CLOSE" COMMAND OUTPUT
CIRCUITRY AND SHORT "PURGE" COMMAND SIGNAL, CAUSING LOSS OF MCA
RELAY CONTROL DURING CLOSE OR PURGE CYCLES. POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS
BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GASES (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO
LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS
ENVIRONMENT. POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B













FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FROM MDMs TO VENT DOOR ACTUATOR MOTORS
PART NUMBER: TBD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P MAY
CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO
LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS
ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY


























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FROM MDMs TO VENT DOOR ACTUATOR MOTORS
TBD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P MAY
CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO
LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS
ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY
CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B















DELAYED OPERATION, PARTIAL OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM








SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P MAY
CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURALAND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO
LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS
ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY





































FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, PREMATURE OPERATION















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







ERRONEOUS INPUT, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ELECTROMAGNETIC
INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION, PARTIAL INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DUE TO
PREMATURE VENT OPENING DURING PRELAUNCH. COULD CAUSE
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INADVERTENT OPENING OF VENT
DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD
DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-697
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, PREMATURE OPERATION














VENT DOOR CONTROL SOFTWARE
CRITICALITIES














A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
GPCS - DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM
N/A
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, PARTIAL INPUT, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING
PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE AN
EXPLOSIVE/TOXIC GAS ENVIRONMENT. INADVERTENT OPENING OF VENT
DORRS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD
DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




REFERENCE DESIGNATORS - FI, F5
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN FUSE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MCA RELAY CONTROL, CAUSING LOSS
OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE TO
INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P COULD
CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
HAZARODUS GAS (H2) BUILDUP DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE
SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CAUSE TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT.
INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL
FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING
RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B



































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PREL_UNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
L_DING/SAFING: 3/3
P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS:_ A_[_ 2_] B [NA ] C [
LOCATION: MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: REFERENCE DESIGNATORS - AIR(X)
CAUSES: .....OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, - TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORTED RESISTOR COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO MDM DOOR POSITION
MONITOR CIRCUITRY AND/OR MCA RELAY LOGIC CIRCUITRY, CAUSING LOSS
OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE TO
INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P COULD
CAUSE QRBITER STRU_L_DPAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM
CONTROL. COULD CAUSE TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY
TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR
ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-
ENTRY.





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




REFERENCE DESIGNATORS - AIR(X)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN RESISTOR WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ANY ACTUATOR MOTOR
MICROSWITCH POSITION FEEDBACK SIGNAL TO MDMs AND MCA RELAY LOGIC
CIRCUIT, CAUSING LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT
PRESSURE CONDITIONS, DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR
OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND
PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS
(H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD
CAUSE TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE
VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD
DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B













DELAYED OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF














VENT DOOR CONTROL SOFTWARE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONdRBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GPCS - DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM
N/A
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, ERRONEOUS INPUT, PARTIAL INPUT, PIECE-
PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING
PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE AN
EXPLOSIVE/TOXIC GAS ENVIRONMENT. LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING
TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS, DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT
DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL
AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-
ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.



































































INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
OPEN LIMIT SWITCHES ($1 & $3)
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & $3)
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & $4)
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & $4)
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID
CIRCUIT BREAK]_R/SWITCH









































INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
0NORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN/CLOSE THE Y/Z STARTRACKER DOOR. OPEN - POSSIBLE
LOCALIZED COMPARTMENT DAMAGE. CLOSED - LOSS OF Y/Z STARTRACKER.
REFERENCES: V070-310730/i, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066


















INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
FAILS TO START/STOP AS COMMANDED AND ROTATES
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
















RTLS : 3/ 3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO : -3/ 3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN/CLOSE THE Y/Z STARTRACKER DOOR. OPEN - POSSIBLE













REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
m
m




ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 9102 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: OPEN LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 3) ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE
OPERATION, SHORTED













OPEN LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 3) ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




S1 & 3; VS70-590202
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, ACCELERATION, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES DOOR IS OPEN WHEN IT MAY BE CLOSED.
IS CLOSED, OPEN CAPABILITY WOULD BE INHIBITED.
IF THE DOOR
m
REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-707
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 3) ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PREMATURE
OPE_TI6N-, _-OPEN _ (ELECTRICAL) < _-_: _ ......











SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM ............
ST_TRACKER DOOR MECHANISM ...._C_C_:_I_
OPEN LIMIT SWITCHES Z(Sl & 3)KCTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




S1 & 3; VS70-590202
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES DOOR NOT OPEN WHEN IT MAY BE PROPERLY














REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 9104 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & 4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE
OPERATION, SHORTED













CLOSE LIMIT SWITCHES (S2 & 4) ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




$2 & 4; VS70-590202
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES DOOR IS CLOSED WHEN IT MAY BE OPEN.
IS OPEN, CLOSE CAPABILITY WOULD BE INHIBITED.
IF THE DOOR
I
REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-709
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 9105 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & 4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PREMATURE
OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL) ................













CLOSE LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & 4) ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: $2 & 4; VS70-590202
] c [ ]
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES DOOR NOT CLOSED WHEN IT MAY BE CLOSED.



















REFERENCES: V070-310730/i, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-



































PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
JAMMED, FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN/CLOSE STARTRACKER DOOR.
REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-711
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










FAII_ TO RE_IN IN POSiTiON, FREELY ROTATES
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: TBD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".














REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-



























ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9100-9107
ALL FAILURE MODES















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9100-9107
CAUSES: ALL CAUSES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9100-9107 WILL HAVE NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, VEHICLE OR CREW.
w
REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-713
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDACID: 9500 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER/SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, PREMATURE OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




S4-Y, S5-Z, CB 26/7
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION,
INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN THE Y/Z STARTRACKER DOOR.




































ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9500
ALL FAILURE MODES















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9500
CAUSES: ALL CAUSES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9500 WILL HAVE NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, VEHICLE OR CREW.
REFERENCES: SSSH DWG. NO. 2.4 SHEET 1-3, 9.6 SHEET i, VS70-
590202/9, -760709













































































































































































































3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
3/_R INVERTED AND GATE
3/IR INVERTED AND GATE















3/IR SOLID STATE DRIVER
3/IR REMOTE PWR CNTRLR
3/IR REMOTE PWR CNTRLR

















3/IR PWR sUpPLY TEST AMP
3/IR FLD EFFECT TRNSSTR
3/IR CONTROL CIRCUIT
3/IR READ ONLY MEMORY

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MCA AC PWR CRCT
MCA RELAY LGC PWR
REMOTE PWR CNTRLLR
DIODE
RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W







































FAILS OUT OF TOL
















FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO REMAIN CLSD
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM










































































































































































































































































































AND GATE #2 .........
40 MS TIME DELAY





































































4641 3/_R EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
4642 3/IR AND GATE #i
4643 3/IR AND GATE #i
4644 3/!R AND GATE #2
4645 3/IR AND GATE #2
4646 3/IR 40 MS TIME DELAY
FAILURE MODE
4 SECOND TIME DELAY FAILS OPEN
AMP #3 FAILS SHORTED
AMP #3 FAILS OPEN -
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR FAILS SHORTED
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR FAILS OPEN







4647 3/1R 40 MS TIME DELAY
4645 3/ R . AMP #1
4649 3/IR AMP #I
4650 3/IR AND GATE #3
4651 3/IR AND GATE #3
4652 3/IR 4 SECOND TIME DELAY
4653 3/IR 4 SECOND TIME DELAY
4654 3/IR AMP #3
4655 3/IR AMP #3
4656 3/IR EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
4657 3/IR EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
4658 3/IR EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
4659 3/IR EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
4660 3/IR AMP #2
4661 3/IR AMP #2
4662 3/IR AMP #2
4663 3/1R AMP #2
4664 3/IR CONVERTER
4665 3/IR CONVERTER
4666 3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
4667 3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
4668 3/IR CAPACITOR BANK
4669 3/IR CAPACITOR BANK
4670 3/IR AND GATE
4671 3/IR AND GATE
4674 3/IR TEST LOGIC
4675 3/IR TEST LOGIC
4676 3/IR CONVERTER
4677 3/IR CONVERTER
4678 3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
4679 3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
4680 3/IR CAPACITOR BANK













































































































































































CNTRLN LTCH GNG TRQ




PBD SHEAR FTTNG RLLR
PBD SHEAR FTTNG RLLR
PBD SHEAR FTTNG RLI_
PBD SHEAR FTTNG CLAW
PBD SHEAR FTTNG CLAW









BLKHD DR CLSD SWTCH
BLKHD RDY-TO-LTCH SW
PYLD BY DR DRV MTR
PYLD BY DR DRV CL
PYLD BY DR DRV BK
PYLD BY DR DRV CL
PYLD BY DR DRV















FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL









FAILS TO ENGAGE CLAW
BROKEN
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM



























































































































PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRVS
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRVR
PYLD BY DR DRVR
PYLD BY DR DRVR
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRVR















MCA AC POWER CRCT















































































































































MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA PURGE SGNL DRVR
MCA DC POWER BUS













FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
PREMATURE OPERATION
OPEN
PARTIAL OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
OPEN
OPEN
OPEN
SHORTED
OPEN
OPEN
DELAYED OPERATION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
OPEN
SHORTED
OPEN
DELAYED OPERATION
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